Categorical Subjects

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Abstract

In this paper we analyse constructions in Japanese and Modern Hebrew in which an initial nominative phrase is followed by what appears to be a complete sentence, rather than a predicate with an open position. We argue that these nominatives, which we term "Broad Subjects" (also referred to as "multiple nominatives" or "Major Subjects" in the literature on Japanese) are interpreted by virtue of abstraction over a position within the clause, which is occupied syntactically by a pronoun (overt in Hebrew, null in Japanese). Hence this construction does not involve movement of the Broad Subject itself. We further argue that Broad Subjects are necessarily interpreted as the subjects of Categorical sentences, as understood in Ladusaw's 1994 interpretation of Kuroda's thetic/categorical distinction.

Keywords: Japanese, Hebrew, subjects, categorical, thetic

1 Introduction

Some languages allow a nominative noun phrase to be followed by what appears to be a fully saturated sentence, rather than a predicate.[1] This phenomenon has been extensively documented for Japanese and Korean in particular, but has also been noted in other languages. In earlier work (Doron and Heycock 1999, Alexopoulou, Doron, and Heycock 2001) we have argued that such nominatives, which we referred to as *Broad Subjects*, occur also in Modern Hebrew and Modern Standard Arabic. Much work on this topic has centered on how multiple instances of nominative case are licensed; in this paper we are principally concerned instead with issues of the syntax-semantics interface. We assume that Broad Subjects are interpreted by virtue of abstraction over a position within the clause, and we address two questions: How is the position of abstraction constrained—in particular, is it created by movement or by anaphor-binding? What consequences does the syntactic structure have for the interpretation of sentences containing a Broad Subject?

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2 Broad Subjects

2.1 Subjects of sentential predicates in Japanese and Modern Hebrew

The possibility of "additional" subjects occurring to the left of what appear to be complete sentences is uncontroversial in Japanese. The following examples illustrate this phenomenon:[2]

(1) a. mary-ga kami-ga nagai (koto)
Mary-NOM hair-NOM long (fact)
(the fact that) Mary has long hair
b. john-ga kuruma-ga seibihuryoo na (koto)
John-NOM car-NOM ill-conditioned is (fact)
(the fact that) John's car is ill-conditioned
c. natu-ga biiru-ga umai (koto)
summer-NOM beer-NOM good (fact)
(the fact that) in summer beer tastes good

In these and subsequent Japanese examples *koto* (fact) has been added so that the sentence is read as an embedded clause; this is done to avoid the awkwardness that can occur when a matrix sentence does not have a *wa*-marked topic. If the clauses in (1) were not embedded, they would most typically occur with the first noun phrase marked with *wa*:

(2) a. mary-wa kami-ga nagai
Mary-TOP hair-NOM long
Mary has long hair.
b. john-wa kuruma-ga seibihuryoo da
John-TOP car-NOM ill-conditioned is
John's car is ill-conditioned.
c. natu-wa biiru-ga umai
summer-TOP beer-NOM good
In summer beer tastes good.

The question of topic and focus interpretation in these sentences will be addressed in Section 4.3.[3]

In Doron and Heycock 1999, Alexopoulou, Doron, and Heycock 2001, we have argued that Hebrew also allows sentence-initial nominative noun phrases which appear to be followed by a complete sentence:[4]

(3) a. ruti yeS l-a savlanut
Ruti there-is to-her patience
Ruti has patience.
b. ruti sof-a le-naceax
Ruti end-hers to-win
Ruti will end up winning.

This construction is treated essentially as left-dislocation by Blau 1966, Nahir 1955, and Peretz 1961, but as we have argued, the initial noun phrase is not dislocated, but a syntactic subject, as claimed

[2] Examples (1a) and (1b) are from Ura 1996, and (1c) from Saito 1982.

[3] From now on the embedding context in the Japanese sentences will generally be ignored in the translations.

[4] In the work cited we discussed Arabic in addition to Hebrew and Japanese; in this article we restrict ourselves to the latter two languages.

already in Ornan 1979 and Rosén 1977 (whose analyses, however, differ considerably from ours).

2.2 The initial phrase is a subject

In the works cited above, we have demonstrated that the inital nominative noun phrase in these constructions has in all cases the properties normally associated with subjects in the relevant languages. In particular, it is neither a dislocated phrase (in the sense of Left-Dislocation or Clitic Left Dislocation (CLLD)) nor in a designated focus position. Here we will simply summarise some of our arguments.

Many authors have argued that in Japanese these initial phrases (*Broad Subjects*) behave like thematic subjects (*Narrow Subjects*). See for example Kuno 1973, Kuroda 1986, Heycock 1993b, and references contained therein. Most obviously, the Broad Subject, unless it is the topic, is marked with *ga*, which is generally considered to be the realization of nominative case. Further, Kuno (1978) pointed out that in the complement clause of E[xceptional] C[ase] M[arking] verbs (that is, verbs that assign case to the subject of their complement clause) can alternate between nominative and accusative marking, just as Narrow Subjects can.

In Hebrew nominative case marking is not overt on noun phrases. However there are many other ways in which the initial noun phrase shows the properties of a subject. One is that in a coordination a single noun phrase may be "shared" between two conjuncts, in one of which it functions as the Broad Subject, and in the other as the Narrow Subject.

(4) ruti yeS l-a savlanut ve-maclixa be-pitron taSbecim
Ruti there-is to-her patience and-is-successful at-solving crossword puzzles
Ruti has patience and is successful at solving crossword puzzles.

Here, according to our analysis, the sequence *yeS la savlanut* (there is to her patience) is a predicate; as such it is expected that it can be conjoined with another predicate: *maclixa be-pitron taSbecim* (is successful at solving crossword puzzles). Note that the latter, being a present tense VP, is undoubtedly only a predicate and not a sentence with a null subject, since present tense VPs do not license *pro*-drop in Hebrew.

Coordinations in which the apparent "shared" subject functions as the Broad Subject of one conjunct and the Narrow Subject of the other are perfectly grammatical in Japanese also; given that the subject is quantificational the following example also cannot be analysed as a coordination of two full sentences with *pro*-drop in the second sentence.

(5) daremo bizin demo nai si se-mo takaku nai (koto)
everyone beauty even NEG and back-also tall NEG (fact)
No one is beautiful or tall.

Although Broad Subjects obligatorily occur outside Narrow Subjects in both Hebrew and Japanese, they do not occur in the kind of peripheral position that left-dislocated phrases do. For example, in both languages Broad Subjects occur freely in embedded contexts, in contrast to left-dislocations (and to *wa*-phrases in Japanese). This is already illustrated for Japanese in the examples that have been given, which have all been complements of the nominal head *koto* rather than matrix clauses. (6) shows a Modern Hebrew example where the Broad Subject is in the antecedent of a conditional:

(6) im be'emet dani ha-xavera Selo mi-carfat, ex ze Se hu af pa'am lo haya Sam
if really Dani the-girlfriend his from-France, how it that he never not was there
If indeed Dani's girlfriend is from France, how come he was never there?

Further, in Hebrew, the example in (7) shows that a Broad Subject may occur to the right of an adjunct, which a left-dislocated phrase in this language may not, as illustrated in (8) (the impossibility of interpreting *dani* in (8) as a Broad Subject follows from constraints that will be discussed in Section 3.1):

(7) be-anglit kol miSpat yeS l-o nose
in-English each sentence there-is to-it a-subject
In English each sentence has a subject.

(8) a. *ba-misrad haze dani dina xikta l-o
in-office this Dani Dina waited for-him
In this office, Dani, Dina waited for him.
b. dani ba-misrad haze dina xikta l-o
Dani in-office this Dina waited for-him
Dani, in this office Dina waited for him.

A further property that distinguishes Broad Subjects from topics and dislocated phrases (both those found in the kind of left-dislocation that English exhibits and in the Clitic Left Dislocation of Romance and Greek) is that Broad Subjects can be bare *wh*-phrases and bare quantifiers, including downward-entailing quantifiers. Example (9a) is an example of a *wh*-phrase from Japanese, and (9b) of a bare quantifier:[5]

(9) a. dare-ga me-ga aoi ka (sitte-iru)
who-NOM eyes-NOM blue QU (know)
I know who has blue eyes.
b. daremo-ga me-ga kuroi (koto)
everyone-NOM eyes-NOM black (fact)
Everyone has dark eyes.

In Modern Hebrew also, the Broad Subject may be a *wh*-phrase or a bare quantifier:

(10) a. mi yeS l-o zman la-dvarim ha-ele
who there-is to-him time for-the-things the-these
Who has the time for these things?
b. af exad eyn be-yad-o la'azor le-rina
no one it-isn't in-power-his to-help Rina
No one has it in his power to help Rina.

In Hebrew it is clear that Broad Subjects are not licensed by focus. In Japanese, however, it has occasionally been claimed that Broad Subjects are in some designated Focus Position (see *e.g.* Kiss 1981, Vermeulen 2002). It is certainly true that Broad Subjects in matrix clauses are typically interpreted as being in focus, but in this respect Broad Subjects do not differ from the subjects of Individual-Level (IL) predicates, as argued in Kuroda 1986 and subsequently in Heycock 1993b. And just like the subjects of IL predicates, Broad Subjects can also be interpreted without focus in a number of contexts, most notably in embedded clauses, as will be discussed in Section 4.3. We conclude that *ga* cannot be analysed as a focus marker, and that the proposal that Broad Subjects are licensed by focus is not sustainable.

In addition to these considerations, there are some language-specific diagnostics which demonstrate that the Broad Subject has the properties of a subject in an A-position. As discussed in Heycock

[5]In the glosses, NMZ is used as an abbrevation for "nominalizer."

1993b, in Japanese a Broad Subject can bind not only the (long distance) reflexive *zibun*, but also the local subject-oriented anaphor *zibun-zisin*, which has been argued not to have the logophoric properties of *zibun* (Kurata 1986, Katada 1991). In Hebrew there is a particular cleft construction which applies to subjects only:

(11) a. dani hu Se- ‘azar le dina
Dani he that helped to Dina
It is Dani who helped Dina.
b. *dina hi Se- dani ‘azar l-a
Dina she that Dani helped to-her
It is Dina that Dani helped.

As we would now expect, Broad Subjects can also be clefted in this construction, as in the following example from Amatzia Porat’s Hebrew translation of Faulkner’s *Absalom, Absalom!*, published by Am Oved Publishers, Tel Aviv, 1983:

(12) Se-harey elen hi be-ecem Se-haya l-a sade panuy
since Ellen she in-reality that-there-was to-her field free
Since it was really Ellen who had the free field.

3 Licensing the Broad Subject

3.1 Constraints on the position abstracted over

With respect to the two languages that we are considering here, there is a marked similarity in the possibilities for the position in the proposition that is abstracted over, although there are also divergences.

1. Possessor of the subject.

   In both languages, very natural examples of Broad Subjects are those in which the Broad Subject corresponds to the possessor of the closest subject. This process can apply recursively.

   (13) john-ga imooto-ga asi-ga waru-i (koto)
   John-NOM sister-NOM leg-NOM bad-PRES (fact)
   John’s sister’s leg is bad.

   In Hebrew, possession can be expressed either by a clitic on the noun (in the construct state) or by a prepositional phrase. Broad Subjects based on the former, as in (14a), sound formal; those based on the latter, as in (14b), are colloquial:

   (14) a. Sum memSala necige-ha hacba‘at-am eyna muvtaxat
   no government representatives-its vote-their is not secured
   No government’s representatives’ vote is secured.
   b. im be’emet dani ha-xavera Selo aba Sela mi-carfat, ex ze Se hu
   if really Dani the-girlfriend his father her from-France, how it that he
   af pa‘am lo haya Sam
   never not was there
   If indeed Dani’s girlfriend’s father is from France, how come he was never there?

2. Sentences with no narrow subject.

Broad Subjects also occur very naturally in sentences with no Narrow Subject. These may involve sentences with null generic human subjects; in Hebrew this is expressed as 3rd person plural masculine agreement on the verb. As there is no exact English equivalent, we translate such sentences as passives, but it should be noted that this is not the structure of the Hebrew originals.

(15) a. af iton erev lo moxrim oto ba-boker
no newspaper evening not sell(3MP) it in the morning
No evening newspaper is sold in the morning.

b. bamay zar Sum seret Selo lo mar'im oto bli targum
director foreign no film his not show(3MP) it without translation
No foreign director's films are shown without subtitles.

Japanese does not show number or person agreement on the verb, but examples such as the following have the same interpretation of a generic human subject:[6]

(16) a. doko-no kantoku-ga anata-no kuni-de yooga-o
where-GEN director-NOM you-GEN country-in western film-ACC
zimaku-nasi-de miseru no?
subtitle-without-by show QU
Film directors of which country, their films are shown in your country without subtitles?

b. eigo-no syoosetu-ga doko-no honya-demo wayaku-o utteiru
English-GEN novel-NOM in any bookshop Japanese translation-ACC sell
(koto)
(fact)
English novels, they sell their Japanese translations in any bookshop.

In Hebrew (but not Japanese) possession is commonly expressed by an impersonal sentence, with no overt subject:

(17) eyn l-o zman
not to-him time
He doesn't have time.

These sentences also allow Broad Subjects very naturally:

(18) af exad eyn l-o zman
no one not to-him time
No one has time.

[6]There seems to be some variation between speakers with respect to the interpretation of these examples: our informants accepted these examples with the interpretations given, but one anonymous reviewer reports that for her/him (16a) can only be interpreted with *kantoku* (directors) functioning as the subject of *miseru* (show). We do not at present have any account for this variation, although it is certainly to be expected that such a parse, which does not involve any null pronominals, might make the other interpretation hard to obtain.

3. Sentences where the Broad Subject appears to be licensed by an "aboutness" relation, or as an adjunct (typically but not invariably) of location or time:

(19) a. oranda-no sakana-ga nisin-ga yoi (koto)
Holland-GEN fish-NOM herring-NOM good (fact)
Among fish in Holland, herring is good/the best.

b. sukottorando-ga yama-ga ooi (koto)
Scotland-NOM mountains-NOM numerous (fact)
Scotland has numerous mountains.

c. natu-ga biiru-ga umai (koto)
summer-NOM beer-NOM delicious (fact)
In summer beer tastes good.

d. ano ziko-ga takusan-no nihonzin-ga sinda (koto)
that accident-NOM many-GEN Japanese-NOM died (fact)
It was in/through that accident that many Japanese people died.

This type of Broad Subject does not occur in Hebrew.

There is not consensus in the literature on how to handle the cases exemplified in (19). In Heycock 1993b it was argued, following Kuroda 1986, that Broad Subjects in Japanese need not be related to any position within the remainder of the sentence, whether by movement or binding of a pronoun. As acknowledged there, however, incontrovertible cases of this kind are hard to show. Some subsequent authors (*e.g.* Tateishi 1991, Takahashi 1994, Vermeulen 2002) have argued that there are two types of *ga*-phrases that are not Narrow Subjects: one type—exemplified by e.g. (13)—is related (either by movement or some other process, depending on the analysis) to a possessor position; the other—exemplified by e.g. (19d)—is related to an sentential adjunct. Examples like (19a,b,c) are sometimes assimilated to "possessor" cases like (13) and sometimes to adjunct cases like (19d).

A hypothesis that covers most cases like (19a,b,c) is that if the Narrow Subject can be analysed as a functional definite, in the sense of Loebner 1985, the position abstracted over may be that of the situational argument to that function. Thus, for example, compare (19a) to (20a), or (19b) to (20b):

(20) a. A: So what did you think of the fish in Holland?
B: The herring was good.

b. A: What is Scotland like?
B: The mountains are beautiful.

Note that this kind of situational argument frequently cannot appear as a genitive possessor:

(21) a. *The fish in Hollands's herring is good.
b. *France's beer is delicious. (*Cf.* I go to France a lot because the beer is delicious.)

Since Hebrew Broad Subjects always bind an overt pronoun, in contrast to Japanese, this might explain why this type of case does not appear in the former language. The only syntactically possible position for the pronoun to be available as the situational argument would be as the possessor of the Narrow Subject; but this would give rise to the same kind of anomaly as in (21).

This account does not however extend in a natural way to cases like (19d), where the Narrow Subject appears to be interpreted as an indefinite. Tateishi 1991, Takahashi 1994, and Vermeulen 2002 treat such cases as distinct in their derivation from the others. Takahashi and Vermeulen argue that this class of "adjunct" *ga*-phrases do not have the subject properties of the others. For the purposes of this paper, therefore, we will set the type exemplified by (19d) aside, assuming that they do not constitute Broad Subjects.[7]

3.2 Abstraction by movement or by anaphor-binding?

In this paper we pursue the hypothesis that Broad Subjects in Hebrew and in Japanese involve abstraction on some argument within the proposition expressed by the constituent that they c-command. In all the cases discussed above, it appears that the position of abstraction is either that of the highest XP argument, or a possessor of that argument.[8] This suggests either A-movement or an anaphoric relation between the Broad Subject and the pronoun.

Although a movement analysis seems appealing, and has been argued for the Japanese construction on more than one occasion (e.g. Tateishi 1991, Fukuda 1991, Ura 1996), there are reasons to reject it for both languages, as argued also in Vermeulen 2002.

In Japanese it has been observed that Broad Subjects may (somewhat marginally) cooccur with a pronoun in the "gap" position (Tateishi 1991, Vermeulen 2002); this has been taken as evidence that the "gap" is really occupied by *pro*, rather than the trace of movement (following the same kind of argumentation that Saito 1985 used to show that in Japanese topicalization of noun phrases, in contrast to scrambling, did not have to involve movement). In Modern Hebrew the argument is even sharper: Broad Subjects in this language obligatorily bind an *overt* pronoun. Note that while pronouns are known to occur in (certain positions in) relative clauses in Modern Hebrew where in English a gap is required (Doron 1982, Borer 1984, Shlonsky 1992) this cannot be considered to be the same phenemenon. Most particularly, there is no locality effect in relative clauses: the pronoun may be separated from the operator position by one or more subjects or other arguments.

(22) a. ha-iS Se dina xoSevet Se ruti pagSa (oto)
the-man that Dina thinks that Ruti met (him)
the man that Dina thinks that Ruti met

b. ha-iS Se dina he'eniSa et ha-yalda Se pagSa *(oto)
the-man that Dina punished ACC the-girl that met *(him)
the man that Dina punished the girl that met him

In fact the pronouns in relative clauses are never argued to be the "spell-out" of traces precisely

[7] We also set aside cases where the initial *ga*-marked phrase is a postpositional phrase:

(i) kono eki-kara-ga tuukin-kyaku-ga ooi (koto)
this station-from-NOM commuters-NOM many (fact)
There are a lot of commuters from this station.

As pointed out by the reviewer who supplied this example, if such cases are Broad Subjects, this is problematic for the claim that Broad Subjects bind a null pro-form, as it has been argued in e.g. Hoji 1985, Saito 1987 that PPs cannot bind empty pro-forms in Japanese. It is possible that a distinction should be made between A-binding and A′ binding, but for now, we must leave this case for further research.

[8] We are assuming that the "null subject" in examples like (15) is constituted by the verbal agreement morphology, along the lines of Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 1998 and earlier work cited there; such subjects are therefore not XP arguments. This account should also be extended to examples like (17)/(18), although here the agreement morphology is not overt.

because the relation with the operator does not respect islands, as shown in (22b)

The movement in relatives is typically taken to be A′-movement (but see Shlonsky 1992 for a somewhat different view), and is thus theoretically expected to behave differently from movement to an A-position (that Broad Subjects occupy A-positions was argued above in Section 2.2). The closest possible analogy to the type of raising necessary to produce a Broad Subject is the possessor raising that has been argued (Landau 1999) to take place from the position of an object, as in (23b) or unaccusative subject (24b).

(23) a. ‘aliyat Sa‘ar ha-dolar hixpila et maskort-a
rise rate the-dollar doubled ACC salary-hers
The rise in the rate of the dollar doubled her salary.
b. ‘aliyat Sa‘ar ha-dolar hixpila le-ruti et ha-maskoret
rise rate the-dollar doubled to-Ruti ACC the-salary
The rise in the rate of the dollar doubled Ruti’s salary.

(24) a. maskorta-a gadla
salary-her rose
Her salary rose.
b. gadla le-ruti ha-maskoret
rose to-Ruti the-salary
Ruti’s salary rose.

The important point to note here is that in these cases the presence of a clitic pronoun in the possessor position within the noun phrase is ungrammatical, in sharp contrast to the case of Broad Subjects.

(25) a. *‘aliyat Sa‘ar ha-dolar hixpila le-ruti et maskort-a
rise rate the-dollar doubled to-Ruti ACC salary-her
The rise in the rate of the dollar doubled Ruti’s salary.
b. *gadla le-ruti maskort-a
rose to-Ruti salary-her
Ruti’s salary rose.

It is in fact possible for a Broad Subject to correspond to such a raised possessor: but as we would predict the only gap is the one left by the initial raising—the Broad Subject must itself bind a clitic pronoun.

(26) af exad lo gadla l-o ha-maskoret
no one not rose to-him the-salary
No one’s salary rose.

The occurrence of pronominals in the position abstracted over constitutes straightforward evidence against a movement derivation. More indirect evidence comes from the lack of what are typically taken to be hallmarks of movement: scope reconstruction and idiom interpretation.

An example like (27) clearly allows *unicorns* to take scope within the lower clause (on this reading there is no commitment to the existence of unicorns). In addition, the bare plural does not have to be read generically:

(27) Unicorns seemed to be grazing under the trees.

As argued in Heycock 1993b, this is in clear contrast to examples like (28) which involve no move-

ment:

(28) ??Unicorns seemed like they were grazing under the trees.

(28) is marginal because there is no possibility of giving *unicorns* scope within the lower clause, or even reading it as an existential with scope in the higher clause. The only possibility is to read it as generic—but this is of course pragmatically odd.

The examples in (29) show that Hebrew Broad Subjects show exactly the same properties as the subject in (28). In (29a) the Narrow Subject has either wide or narrow scope relative to the adverb *every now and then*; when read with wide scope it tends to receive a generic interpretation, but it can also be read as a narrow scope existential. In (29b), on the other hand, only the former reading is available for the same phrase as a Broad Subject:

(29) a. hacagot tovot ‘olot midey pa‘am
plays good are-performed every now and then
Good plays are performed every now and then. *Ambiguous*
b. hacagot tovot ma‘alim ot-an midey pa‘am
plays good they-perform ACC-them every now and then
Good plays are performed every now and then. *Unambiguous*

Similar data exist also in Japanese. In Doron and Heycock 1999 this was shown with respect to universally quantified Broad Subjects binding a position within a relative clause. The effect can also be seen for possessors, however. The simple sentence in (30) is ambiguous: *minna* (everyone) can distribute over *konpyuuta*, or *konpyuuta* can take widest scope, resulting in the reading where there is a single computer, owned jointly:

(30) minna-no konpyuuta-ga kowarete simatta (koto)
everyone-GEN computer-NOM broke down (fact)
Everyone’s computer broke down.

If *minna* occurs as a Broad Subject, however, only the distributive reading survives; the reading where there is a single jointly-owned computer is no longer available:

(31) minna-ga konpyuuta-ga kowarete simatta (koto)
everyone-NOM computer-NOM broke down (fact)
Everyone’s computer broke down.

The data above show that Broad Subjects do not show the kind of scope reconstruction effects that are characteristic of A-movement. We would argue that they also do not allow the kind of “idiom reconstruction” that is typical of movement. A standard illustration of the difference between raising and control (a type of binding) is that phrases that are themselves idiomatic, and hence do not refer in the normal way, can be raised, but cannot act as controllers:

(32) a. The cat seems to be out of the bag. *Idiomatic*
b. The cat tried to be out of the bag. *Literal only*

The use of idioms as a test for movement in multiple subject constructions is suggested in Sakai 1994 and Ura 1996. Our conclusions however are different from theirs, as will be discussed below.

One difficulty with using idioms is that some idioms are completely frozen. So, for example, *headway* may be moved to subject position in a passive and retain its idiomatic collocation with

make; notoriously, this is not possible for *the bucket* in (33b), or *the bullet* in (33c). The same holds true of topicalisation, illustrated in (34).

(33) a. Only a little headway has been made.
b. #Sadly, the bucket has been kicked.
c. #Now the bullet will really have to be bitten.

(34) a. Some headway we have made (although we still have a way to go).
b. #The bucket, he kicked (although he had been very healthy up until then).
c. #The bullet, I can bite (although I would much rather not go through this painful experience).

Thus a single case (or even several cases) where an idiomatic meaning does not survive if one of the elements appears as a Broad Subject could be explained as instances of the same kind of "freezing" that we see in (33b,c), (34b,c). The following examples from Hebrew, however, demonstrate that there are idioms where a noun phrase can retain its idiomatic interpretation when affected by A-movement in a passive (so the idiom is not frozen), but cannot appear as a Broad Subject. The Hebrew idiom *to blunt someone's teeth* means *to scold someone*, as in (35):

(35) kvar hikheti et Sin-av Sel dani pe'amim rabot
already blunted(1S) ACC teeth-his GEN Dani times many
I have scolded Dani many times.
Literally: I have blunted Dani's teeth many times.

The phrase *Sin-av Sel dani* (Dani's teeth) can undergo A-movement, as shown by its ability to passivize:

(36) Sin-av Sel dani kvar hukhu pe'amim rabot
teeth-his GEN Dani already were-blunted times many
Dani has been scolded many times.
Literally: Dani's teeth have been blunted many times.

However, the same phrase cannot retain its idiomatic interpretation as a Broad Subject:

(37) Sin-av Sel dani kvar hikhu ot-an pe'amim rabot
teeth-his GEN Dani already blunt(3MP) ACC-them times many
Dani's teeth have been blunted many times. *Literal only.*

The same pattern is found in the idiom *to hang the collar round someone's neck* meaning *to blame someone*. In (38b) the object has been promoted to subject by passivization, and the idiomatic intepretation is retained; in (38c) the same phrase appears as a Broad Subject, and only the literal interpretation is available.

(38) a. tamid tolim et ha-kolar be-cavar-o Sel ha-nasi
always hang(3MP) ACC the-collar at-neck-his GEN the-president
One always blames the president.
Literally: The collar is always hanged round the president's neck.
b. ha-kolar tamid nitle be-cavar-o Sel ha-nasi
the-collar always is-hanged at-neck-his GEN the-president
The president is always blamed.
Literally: The collar is always hanged round the president's neck.

c. ha-kolar tamid tolim ot-o be-cavar-o Sel ha-nasi
the-collar always hang(3MP) ACC-it at-neck-his GEN the-president
The collar is always hanged round the president's neck *Literal only*

When the Broad Subject corresponds to a possessor of some kind, the situation is necessarily less clear, as no other type of A-movement can affect such a noun phrase, hence there is no direct comparison. Of course, this would not matter in particular if "idiom reconstruction" were possible: this would be evidence for movement. Sakai (1994) and Ura (1996) maintain that "possessor raising" does indeed show the relevant effects. (39a) is from Sakai 1994, (39b,c) from Ura 1996:

(39) a. soko-nara john-no/-ga kao-ga kiku
there-as for John-GEN/-NOM face-NOM works
As for that place, John has some influence there.
Literally: John's face works.

b. john-no/-ga me-no-tama-ga kuroi
John-GEN/-NOM eye-GEN-ball-NOM black
John is alive.
Literally: John's eyeball is black.

c. sono nyuusu-niyotte, john-no/-ga me-no-iro-ga kawatta
that news-because of John-GEN/-NOM eye-GEN-colour-NOM changed
Because of that news, John got angry.
Literally: The colour of John's eye changed.

These examples do not, however, make the necessary point. In each case what is idiomatic is the collocation between the subject noun phrase—regardless of the possessor—and the predicate. The phrase that can be the Broad Subject is actually in the "free" position within the idiom, and is itself not part of the idiom. Thus these examples are parallel to idioms like *to paint the town red* (to have a wild night of partying) or *X's goose is cooked* (X is in serious trouble); note that the preservation of the idiomatic readings in (40) does not license the assumption that *be capable of* allows raising in (40a), or that *John* has moved to the position after *of* in (40b):

(40) a. John is capable of painting the town red.
b. We can safely say of John that his goose is cooked.

The cases that are necessary to make the relevant argument are ones in which the idiomatic collocation is between the possessor and the possessee. Possible examples include (41) from Hebrew and (42) from Japanese:

(41) ptixat-o Sel ha-pe la-satan eyna mumlecet
opening-its of the-mouth to-Satan not recommended
Don't talk about misfortunes lest they come.
Literally: Opening one's mouth to the Devil is not recommended.

(42) a. seikoo-no kagi
success-GEN key
the key to success

b. kiboo-no hosi
hope-GEN star
our best hope
Literally: the star of hope

In neither language do these cases retain their idiomatic meaning when a Broad Subject is added that corresponds to the possessor:

(43) #ha-pe ptixat-o la-satan eyna mumlecet
the-mouth opening-its to-Satan not recommended
Only the literal meaning.

(44) a. seikoo-no/*-ga kagi-ga okane nara . . .
success-GEN/-*NOM key-NOM money if
If the secret of success is money . . .

b. kiboo-no/*-ga hosi-ga Bekkamu nara . . .
hope-GEN/*-NOM star-NOM Beckham if
If our best hope is Beckham . . .

The absence of the idiomatic reading when the "possessor" occurs as a Broad Subject is expected if there is no movement, and unexpected otherwise.[9]

4 Subjects in thetic and categorical sentences

4.1 Broad subjects behave like the subjects of Individual Level Predicates

As we have seen, Broad Subjects differ from phrases that have undergone left-dislocation, clitic left-dislocation, and focus-movement, and instead show the hallmarks of "ordinary" subjects. It is possible to more precise, however: Broad Subjects behave like the subjects of Individual-Level (IL) predicates, in the sense of Carlson 1977. In particular, Broad Subjects cannot be DPs under a weak construal.

For example, the Broad Subject *kuzira* (whales) in the following examples cannot receive an existential reading, but only a (narrowly focussed) generic one (we will come back to the issue of focus in Section 4.3).

[9] An anonymous reviewer cites (ia,b) as counterexamples (*pan-no mimi*, literally 'the ear of the bread' is an idiom for 'breadcrust'):

(i) a. kono taihuu-ga me-ga hakkirisi-nai-no-wa mada tiisai kara da
this typhoon-NOM eye-NOM clear-NEG-NMZ-TOP still small because is
The eye$_i$ of this typhoon is not clear because it$_i$ is still small.

b. pan-ga mimi-ga kogetara tamago-o tabeta hoo-ga yoi
bread-NOM ear-NOM burned egg-ACC ate way-NOM good
If the crust of the bread is burnt it would be better to eat the egg.

In Nunberg, Sag, and Wasow 1994 it is noted with respect to Italian that the objects of idiomatic combinations can be the antecedents for object pronouns, but that this is not true of "idiomatic phrases," contrasting e.g. (iia) (their (15)) with (iib) (their (19)):

(ii) a. Andreotti ha tenuto le fila fino al 92, e poi le ha tenute Craxi.
Andreotti has held the lines until 92 and then them has held Craxi
Andreotti held the lines (i.e. ran things from behind the scenes) until 92, and then Craxi held them.

b. *Gianni ha mangiato la foglia, ed anche Maria l'ha mangiata.
Gianni has eaten the leaf and also Maria it has eaten
Gianni ate the leaf (i.e. caught on to the deception), and Maria ate it too.

While we do not currently have an explanation for why the idiomatic Japanese examples in (i) are acceptable, in contrast to the Hebrew examples and the Japanese examples in (44), we believe that the status of the idioms involved would have to be carefully checked before concluding that examples like (i) prove that the initial nominative phrase has moved from the possessor position in the second noun phrase.

(45) A: o-ga mieru no-wa kuzira desitakke, iruka desitakke?
tail-NOM visible NMZ-TOP whale was-QU dolphin was-QU
Was it whales or dolphins whose tails can be seen?
B: kuzira-ga o-ga mieru-n desu yo
whale-NOM tail-NOM visible-NMZ is PRT
It is whales whose tails can be seen.

(46) (hora asoko!) *kuzira-ga o-ga mieru!
oh over there whale-NOM tail-NOM visible
Look over there! Whale's tails are visible!

This is in contrast to the Narrow Subject of a Stage Level (SL) predicate:

(47) (hora asoko!) kuzira-ga mieru!
oh over there whale-NOM visible
Look over there! Whales are visible!

The absence of an existential reading for the Broad Subject in (46) also contrasts with cases where the Broad Subject is not "bare," but has a numeral modifier:

(48) (hora! mite-goran.) heino-mukoo-ni neko-ga ippiki atama-to sippo-ga mieteiru-yo
oh look fence-over-at cat-NOM one head-and tail-NOM visible
Look! There is one cat over the fence whose head and tail you can see.

This is just as expected, since numerals (unlike for example English *a(n)*), are not necessarily weak. In their strong reading they are predicted to be possible as the subjects of Individual Level predicates. So the contrast between (46) and (48) parallels that between (49a) and (49b).

(49) a. *A child knows French.
b. One child knows French.

Similarly, in Hebrew the bare noun phrase *kafe tov* (good coffee) can only receive a generic reading when it appears as a Broad Subject in (50a); as an object, or the subject of an SL predicate, it can be read existentially:

(50) a. kafe tov ma'amidim oto li-rSut ha-orxim ba-boker
coffee good stand-CAUSE(3MP) it to-disposal (of)-the-guests in-the-morning
Good coffee is made available to the guests in the morning.
b. ba- boker Sotim kafe tov
in-the morning drink(3MP) coffee good
In the morning, one drinks good coffee.
c. kafe tov omed li-rSut ha-orxim ba-boker
coffee good stands to-disposal (of)-the-guests in-the-morning
Good coffee is available to the guests in the morning.

This parallels exactly the behaviour of bare plurals and mass nouns when they are the subject of an IL predicate in English:

(51) a. Dams are useful. [IL predicate: Generic only]
b. Beavers build dams. [IL predicate: existential reading for object *dams* possible].
c. Dams were visible on the horizon. [SL predicate: existential reading possible].

(52) a. Coffee is delicious. [IL predicate: Generic only]
b. Italians drink coffee. [IL predicate: existential reading for object *coffee* possible].
c. Coffee was on sale at the supermarket. [SL predicate: existential reading possible].

In many cases of Broad Subjects the lexical predicate in the sentence is in fact an Individual Level predicate, (e.g. *be black*, *have patience*, etc.), but this is not necessarily the case:

(53) adam mevugar yelad-av azvu et ha-bayit
person elderly children-his left ACC the-house
An elderly person has children who have left home.

(54) sono nyuusu-niyotte, john-ga me-no-iro-ga kawatta
that news-because of John–NOM eye-GEN-colour-NOM changed
Because of that news, John got angry.
Literally: The color of John's eyes changed.

Note in particular that in an example like (53), although the lexical predicate is stage-level/eventive, the indefinite Broad Subject can only be interpreted generically; the same is true, as we have seen, for the Japanese examples in (45), (46)

One possible explanation for the generalisation that Broad Subjects behave like the subjects of IL predicates even when the lexical predicate appears to be eventive/stage-level lies in the proposals about quantification made by Kratzer 1989, 1995, and Diesing 1992. In these accounts, the position in which a phrase is base-generated/merged determines whether it will fall within the restrictive clause or the nuclear scope of any operators in the sentence, including the generic operator.

A central achievement of Diesing's approach is an account for the obligatory generic interpretation of the bare plural in sentences of the type illustrated in (55):

(55) Dogs bark.

Very roughly, the account is as follows. Diesing adopts the proposal that subjects may be generated inside the the VP. Unlike most recent analysts who have argued for this proposal however, she explicitly denies that all subjects are generated in this position: Spec(IP) is also a possible site for the merging of a subject. Since she continues to assume that the verb assigns its θ-role to the VP-internal subject position, it may be asked how a subject generated directly in Spec(IP) is licensed. The answer that she proposes is that there are two types of Infl: one is a raising predicate (as in most other versions of the VP-internal subject hypothesis—e.g. Koopman and Sportiche 1991) but the other is a control predicate which assigns its own external θ-role to the Spec(IP) position. Further, the two different types of Infl do not cooccur freely with any lexical predicate: rather, Control Infl selects IL predicates, while Raising Infl selects stage-level (SL) predicates. Thus, while (56a), with an IL predicate, has the S-Structure representation in (57a), (56b), with an SL predicate, has the S-Structure representation in (57b):

(56) a. Free range eggs are expensive.
b. Free range eggs are available.

(57) a. $[_{IP}$ [free range eggs]$_i$ are $[_{VP}$ PRO$_i$ expensive]]
b. $[_{IP}$ [free range eggs]$_i$ are $[_{VP}$ t$_i$ available]]

The difference in the S-Structure representations is that in the IL sentence Spec(VP) is occupied by PRO, while in the SL sentence it is occupied by the trace of the subject that was generated there. At

LF the distinction between the two cases is clearer, as Diesing adopts May's (1977, 1985) proposal that an NP may lower to the position of its trace at LF. Then the last crucial proposal that enables her to explain the differing interpretations of the subjects in (56a) and (56b) above is her *Mapping Hypothesis*:

> *Mapping Hypothesis*
> Material from VP is mapped into the nuclear scope.
> Material from IP is mapped into a restrictive clause.

In the original example, *bark* is an IL predicate. Hence it occurs with Control Infl and *dogs* can only be generated in Spec(IP), as a result of which it has to map onto the restrictive clause.

Under these assumptions, as long as the Broad Subject is merged in subject position, rather than reaching there by movement we can predict that it should only be able to occur within the restrictive clause. This prediction is met, as shown by the examples in (45)–(54), or the contrast between the following two Hebrew examples, where the second has a Broad Subject:

(58) a. ba- boker Sotim kafe tov
in-the morning drink(3MP) coffee good
In the morning, one drinks good coffee.
b. kafe tov Sotim oto ba- boker
coffee good drink(3MP) it in-the morning
Good coffee, one drinks it in the morning.

In (58a), where the bare noun phrase *kafe tov* (good coffee) is in the argument position within the VP, it can be interpreted either existentially or generically; in (58b) on the other hand, where it is generated as a Broad Subject, it can only be interpreted generically. Note that while we have translated (58b) as an English left dislocation (English not allowing Broad Subjects), in Hebrew there is at least one derivation of this sentence where the initial phrase is a Broad Subject, as shown by the coordination in (59) (as noted earlier, there is no *pro*-drop in the present tense in Hebrew, so the second conjunct is unambiguously a predicate, and this is not coordination of two full sentences):

(59) kafe tov Sotim ot-o ba-boker ve maSpi'a kol ha-yom
coffee good drink(3MP) ACC-it in-the-morning and effects all the-day
Good coffee, one drinks it in the morning and [it] has an effect all day.

4.2 Broad Subjects as Categorical Subjects

Although Diesing's approach to splitting the sentence into restrictive scope and nuclear clause makes some correct predictions for our data, it has a number of drawbacks, both empirical and conceptual.

First, the distinction between the two types of Infl (Raising and Control) is a stipulation that has no independent justification of which we are aware. Further, this stipulation is not sufficient alone: it must also be stipulated that the Raising Infl selects SL predicates while the Control Infl selects IL predicates. Nothing in the system rules out the reverse situation.

Regarding our own data, we find that there are differences between Narrow Subjects of IL predicates and Broad Subjects that are not easily reconcilable with Diesing's approach. For example, we showed in Doron and Heycock 1999 that the requirement in Hebrew that some XP occur in clause initial position (unless the EPP is satisfied by agreement morphology alone, as discussed in footnote 8) cannot be satisfied by a Broad Subject. The initial XP that satisfies this requirement may be the Narrow Subject, but it may equally be some other element in the sentence, as shown in (60a,b)

(60) a. leyad mexonit-o Sel kol sar ‘omed Somer roS-o
by car-his of each minister stands body guard-his
By the car of each minister stands his bodyguard.
b. Somer roS-o Sel kol sar ‘omed leyad mexonit-o
body guard-his of each minister stands by car-his
The bodyguard of each minister stands by his car.

(61a), where the verb is in absolute initial position, is ungrammatical—but so is (61b), where the Broad Subject precedes it.

(61) a. *‘omed Somer roS-o Sel kol sar leyad mexonit-o
stands guard head-his of each minister by car-his
The bodyguard of each minister stands by his car.
b. *kol sar ‘omed Somer roS-o leyad mexonit-o
each minister stands guard head-his by car-his
Each minister, his bodyguard stands by his car.

If a Broad Subject occurs in initial position, some other XP (e.g. the Narrow Subject) must also precede the verb:

(62) kol sar Somer roS-o ‘omed leyad mexonit-o
each minister guard head-his stands by car-his
Literally: Each minister, his bodyguard stands by his car.

In our earlier paper, we argued that this is because the requirement for an initial XP can only be satisfied by an argument that has moved from lower in the structure, within the VP. But now note that the subjects of Individual Level predicates can satisfy this requirement:

(63) dani yodea carfatit
Dani knows French.

This suggests that the subjects of Individual Level predicates also must originate within the VP and reach this position by movement—but this is not consistent with Diesing’s proposal. This problem arises even more sharply in Arabic, as discussed in Doron and Heycock 1999.

For these conceptual and empirical reasons, we would like to find an alternative to Diesing’s approach. In an important paper, Ladusaw (1994) has argued for such an alternative. His proposal is that the failure of weak quantifiers to appear as the subjects of IL predicates can be derived from the proposal that IL predicates necessarily occur in *categorical* sentences.

Ladusaw takes the idea of a linguistic distinction between thetic and categorical judgments from the seminal work by Kuroda, (deloping ideas from the philosophy of Franz Brentano and more particularly from Brentano’s student Anton Marty (see Kuroda 1992 for references)). Very roughly, a sentence expressing a thetic judgment simply affirms the existence of an eventuality of a certain type. A categorical sentence could be used to describe the same situation, but in a different way: first attention is drawn to an object, and then a property is affirmed or denied of this object. In Ladusaw’s modelling of Kuroda’s distinction between thetic and categorical judgements, there is a crucial distinction made between descriptions (which can be satisfied either by an eventuality or an individual) and properties. His “modified Brantanan ontology” is as follows:

(64) objects: individuals, eventualities
descriptions of individuals and descriptions of eventualities

properties

These are then the basis for the two "forms of judgment":

(65) Judgment structure

a. Basis for a thetic judgment: a description
b. Basis for a categorical judgment: an object and a property
c. A thetic judgment is an affirmation or denial of the description in the basis. (Existential commitment)
d. A categorical judment is an affirmation or denial of the basis property to the object in the basis. (Predication)

Thus in a thetic judgment what is asserted is the description of the eventuality associated with the verb; hence the eventuality is the only object whose existence is affirmed. This is straightforward for an impersonal sentence (one with no arguments); but if (66) is taken as a thetic sentence, how is the description of the train composed with the description of the eventuality?

(66) The train has arrived.

Ladusaw's proposal is that arguments to verbs may combine with the verb by restricting a parameter in the description of the eventuality; in a thetic sentence the existential quantification over the eventuality will then unselectively bind the other descriptions also, so the existence of the objects satisfying them is entailed, but "obliquely." The technicalities of how an argument may combine with a verb by restricting a parameter are discussed in much greater detail in Chung and Ladusaw 2001.

As noted, properties are distinct from descriptions. IL predicates are taken to be properties. Descriptions can combine with other descriptions by restriction, but they cannot combine with non-descriptions. Hence IL predicates cannot be the basis of thetic judgments. Crucially, though, the implication does not hold the other way. Ladusaw proposes that properties can be derived from thetic judgments by a process of abstraction, arriving at a derived property which is "the property of being a participant in an eventuality of that description" (p. 225).

In our analysis, Broad Subjects always combine with predicates that are obtained by abstraction. As we have seen, the proposition that is extracted over may be based on an IL predicate; but this is not necessary. Thus examples like (45), (46), (53) and (54) are exactly cases of properties derived from (thetic) descriptions. So Ladusaw's proposal fits exactly with the observation that Broad Subjects behave like the subjects of Individual Level predicates even when the lexical predicate is itself Stage Level. We therefore conclude that Broad Subjects are necessarily "Categorical Subjects"—the subjects of categorical sentences.

4.3 The nature of the thetic/categorical distinction

We have just said that we take (53) and (54) to be cases of properties derived from thetic judgments. Ladusaw's own example of a derived property is one that he borrows from Kuroda: a Japanese sentence where the *wa*-phrase corresponds to the object (note that the Japanese sentence is not passivised):

(67) neko-wa inu-ga oikakete iru
cat-TOP dog-NOM chasing is
The cat is being chased by a/the dog.

It needs to be pointed out, however, that Ladusaw's approach to the thetic/categorical distinction is not completely compatible with Kuroda's. The empirical basis of Kuroda's (1972, 1992) discussion centers on the difference of interpretation between matrix clauses in Japanese in which the subject appears with the nominative case-marker *ga* and those in which it appears with the topic marker *-wa*:

(68) a. neko-ga asoko-de nemutte-iru
cat-NOM there-at sleeping-is
A/the cat is sleeping there.
b. neko-wa asoko-de nemutte-iru
cat-TOP there-at sleeping-is
A/the cat is sleeping there.

Kuroda's claim is that the term "topic marker" for Japanese *wa* is misleading; instead *wa* is a marker for the subject of categorical judgments; hence (68b) is an instance of such a judgment, while (68a) is a thetic sentence.

If we confine ourselves to declarative matrix clauses, Ladusaw's reinterpretation of Kuroda's distinction between these judgment types seems compatible with the original Japanese data concerning the distribution of *wa*. When we consider subordinate clauses, however, we begin to see a split between the two approaches. Most strikingly, in a wide range of subordinate clauses *wa* typically does not appear except in situations of contrast. Take a generic sentence like "Foxes are red". As a matrix sentence the subject will appear with *wa*, as expected, since generic sentences are categorical sentences *par excellence*. The sentence is not ungrammatical without *wa*, however, a point we will return to shortly; but in this case the subject is necessarily interpreted with narrow focus:

(69) a. kitune-wa akai
foxes-TOP red
Foxes are red
b. kitune-ga akai
foxes-NOM red
[$_{Focus}$ FOXES] are red.

In a subordinate clause, such as the antecedent of a conditional, or as the complement to a noun, nominative marking allows the generic reading with or without narrow focus:

(70) kitune-ga akai nara, watasi-ga mita no-wa kitune dewa nai
fox-NOM red if I-NOM saw NMZ-TOP fox NEG
If foxes are red, what I saw wasn't a fox.

(71) kitune-ga akai to-iu koto-o sitte, kanozyo-wa odoroita
fox-NOM red that fact-ACC learning she-TOP was surprised
She was surprised at the fact that foxes are red.

One could take the position that such subordinate clauses do not express judgments at all (this appears to be the position of Kuroda 1992). But if this is so, we can no longer appeal to the thetic/categorical distinction to explicate the distribution of weak quantifiers, as these are impossible as the subjects of IL predicates in embedded clauses, just as in main clauses. Thus the bare plurals in (72) can only receive a generic, not an existential interpretation:

(72) a. If foxes are white I will be surprised. $\neq$
If there are white foxes I will be surprised.

b. I was surprised to discover that foxes are white. $\neq$
I was surprised to discover that there are white foxes.

As we have set out above, in Ladusaw's view the thetic/categorical distinction is not to be stated in terms of Information Structure; thus it is not surprising that the distinction should be operative in subordinate clauses—and indeed, although he provides no exemplification, Ladusaw himself appeals to the lack of a root/nonroot asymmetry in the effects that he is interested in as motivation for a semantic rather than a discourse account:

> The principal argument for seeing [the thetic/categorical] distinction as part of the semantic foundation is that (perhaps universally) certain attempts to create a proposition simply fail, and they fail in embedded contexts as well as root contexts. p. 228

Note that it is not only in embedded contexts that the two approaches differ; we would also expect to see the independence of the thetic/categorical distinction from distinctions relevant to Information Structure in other ways. For example, given Ladusaw's perspective, we would expect that the Categorical Subject could be the focus in informational terms. So in English bare plural Categorical Subjects can be topic or focus—but even in the latter case still only the generic reading is possible:

(73) A: Are there any red animals?
B: Yes, FOXES are red. $\neq$
There are red foxes.

In Japanese also, as we have seen already in (69b), the subject of a generic sentence can be a narrow focus, and hence not marked with *wa*; this is as expected under Ladusaw's account, but problematic under Kuroda's (as acknowledged with respect to the corresponding questions in Kuroda 1992, p. 55).

For these reasons, we retain Ladusaw's viewpoint, which means that we cannot adopt Kuroda's position that in Japanese only *wa*-marked phrases are Categorical Subjects. We believe that Kuroda may be correct in his position that *wa*-phrases are Categorical Subjects, as Ladusaw also assumed; although it seems that in addition they carry information that relates to Information Packaging (hence their much freer occurrence in main clauses), a conclusion that Kuroda argues against. The point is that *wa*-marking is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for status as a Categorical Subject. Thus Broad Subjects may occur with overt nominative marking in certain circumstances, just as other Categorical Subjects may (such as the subjects of IL predicates).[10]

5 Conclusion

In this paper we have argued that the Broad Subjects found both in Japanese and in Modern Hebrew are not the result of a movement derivation, but rather that they bind an anaphoric pronoun (overt in Hebrew, (typically) covert in Japanese); this binding corresponds to abstraction over that argument position, which is what makes it possible to interpret these subjects. We have further argued that Broad Subjects are necessarily interpreted as Categorical Subjects, and that this accounts for a number of the constraints on their interpretation. A number of questions of course remain unanswered. We have not discussed the licensing of multiple instances of nominative case in this paper, but a question that has to be answered with respect to this construction is the nature of the trigger for the parameter allowing

[10] An account for the tendency for the subjects of IL predicates to be interpreted with narrow focus if they occur without *wa*-marking in a matrix sentence is given in Heycock 1993a; we believe that it could be extended to Categorical Subjects in general, as understood by Ladusaw, but we will not attempt that extension here.

multiple checking of nominative case. On the interpretive side, the exact nature of the connection between the thetic/categorical distinction on the one hand, and Information Structure on the other remains to be fully explicated.

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