Instructor: Michal Feldman
FINAL
PROJECT IS DUE ON NOVEMBER 1, 2008
The
project should be submitted by email to mfeldman@huji.ac.il
(myself) and to ilan.nehama@mail.huji.ac.il (Ilan Nehama).
Course description: Recent years have seen a flurry of research activity on problems lying at the border of computer science, game theory and microeconomics. This trend is, in part, due to the emergence of the Internet, which is composed of distributed computer networks managed by multiple administrative authorities and shared by users with competing interests. This course reflects the state of the art research in the boundaries of these disciplines, and will cover a broad range of topics, including auction design and mechanism design, combinatorial auctions, computational complexity of equilibria, network games, potential and congestion games, price of anarchy, price of stability, digital goods, and more.
Course textbook: Algorithmic Game Theory,
(username=agt1user, password=camb2agt). Cambridge University Press.
Editors: Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos and Vijay Vazirani.
TA of the course: Ilan Nehama, email: ilan.nehama@mail.huji.ac.il
Final
project's instructions
1. Student group size: 1-3 students. The expectation from the project will be proportional to the number of students participating.
2. Proposal and approval: a proposal should be submitted and include:
1. List of students in the group.
2. General area and specific set of papers.
3. Type of project.
3. intermediate project progress report: explain what results you have obtained already, what (if any) difficulties you encountered, and what you plan to do to complete your project
4. Possible project types:
1. Summary of a few papers (average 2-3 papers) on a specific subject, including: research area, main research questions, main contribution and results, main proof ideas and methodology, interesting extensions or modifications to the model and possible challenges.
2. Concentrating on a specific paper, considering extensions or modification the model, and study how they impact the results.
3. Looking at a specific research (usually inspired by some paper) and trying to prove something new. (There is no need to guarantee something new, in case you fail it is sufficient to describe what where the "proof attempts" and why did they "fail".)
4. A more empirical work, trying to do an empirical evaluation of a certain game theoretic environment. You will need to specify what are the goals of the investigation, and whatever results you obtained.
Problem
sets:
Problem set 1. Assigned:
June 3, 2008. Due: June 21, 2008. Solution.
Problem set 2.
Assigned: July 28, 2008. Due: August 11, 2008. (note: submission of problem set
2 is not mandatory, but I highly recommend solving it).
Classes
|
Date |
Topics |
Slides |
Reading |
|
May 11, 2008 |
Intro to game theory (dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, …) |
|
|
|
May 18, 2008 |
Zero-sum games, mixed strategies, Nash's theorem, |
AGT, chapter 1 |
|
|
May 25, 2008 |
Potential games |
AGT, chapter 17 |
|
|
June 1, 2008 |
Potential games (cont'd) |
AGT, chapter 19 |
|
|
June 8, 2008 |
Shavuot evening (no class) |
||
|
June 15, 2008 |
Load balancing, strong equilibrium, total search problems |
|
AGT, chapter 20 AGT, chapter 2 |
|
June 22, 2008 |
Load balancing on related machines, routing atomic flow |
AGT, chapter 18 AGT, chapter 20 |
|
|
June 29, 2008 |
Intro to social choice theory |
No slides |
AGT, chapter 9 |
|
July 6, 2008 |
Arrow impossibility theorem |
No slides |
AGT, chapter 9 |
|
July 13, 2008 |
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, mechanism design, Intro to VCG mechanisms |
No slides |
AGT, chapter 9 |
|
July 20, 2008 |
VCG mechanisms, Combinatorial Auctions, Single-minded bidders |
No slides |
AGT, chapter 11 |
|
July 27, 2008 |
LOS mechanism for Single-minded bidders, LPR formulation |
No slides |
AGT, chapter 11 |
|
August 3, 2008 |
Combinatorial auctions approximation |
"Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement free bidders", Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira, STOC'05. |