Division of Household Labor in Germany and Israel: Time Constraints, Resource Dependence and Gender Ideology

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Abstract

Recent comparative research on the division of household division of labor focused, for the most part, on institutional characteristics of various welfare regimes and viewed these as primary determinants of micro-level patterns of household division of labor. In this paper we diverge from this line of argument and propose that comparative analysis should place greater emphasis on family patterns which are associated with culturally sanctioned gender orders. We compare the patterns of household division of labor in Germany and Israel - two countries that share key elements of the conservative welfare regime but differ in their gender regimes. On the basis of these differences we develop several hypotheses and evaluate them with the ISSP 2002, Family and Gender-Roles data. We examine the division of labor both in terms of time spent on household chores and the extent of sharing in specific household tasks. We find that Israeli couples (women and men alike) spend less time doing housework than German couples, but there are no country differences in the reported division of household labor between spouses after controlling for the demographic composition of the two societies. The division of household labor among couples in Israel is more strongly affected by women’s market work and the presence of children, where we find a stronger relationship between wives’ market work and husbands’ contribution to housework, as well. In Germany the gender order of household labor is more rigid than in Israel and the presence of children generally polarizes the gender division of labor. In both countries we find strong relationship between gender-role attitudes and the division of household labor. On the basis of these findings we discuss the theoretical advantages of undertake the comparative study of gender inequality from the vantage point of family and gender regimes.
Introduction

Despite a remarkable rise in female labor force participation and a persistent, albeit sluggish movement towards greater gender equality in society, household work remains highly segregated and predominantly a women’s responsibility. Over the past decades women have reduced somewhat the amount of time spent on household tasks; yet, they still do considerably more than their male spouses (Bianchi et al 2000; Shelton and John 1996, Van Berkel 1997). Moreover, routine activities essential to the functioning of the household are typically performed by women, and male spouses who take part in housework tend to shy away from the less pleasant chores (Van Berkel 1997). Indeed, only a minority of couples share the responsibilities for household tasks (Goldscheider and Waite 1991; Presser 1994; Stier and Lewin-Epstein 2000; Van Berkel 1997).

While there is no disagreement regarding the facts of the gendered patterns of household work, our understanding of this phenomenon and its persistence is still rather rudimentary. Recent studies have made some progress in integrating and articulating a number of sociological perspectives on the household division of labor and have carried out comprehensive data analysis (Baxter 1997; Bianchi et al. 2000; Coltrane 2000; Goldscheider and Waite 1991), but the relationship between the household division of labor and the broader societal context remains rather elusive. For example, researchers that have studied the conditions under which men increase their share of housework and participate in traditionally female activities found only weak associations with spouses characteristics as well as their patterns of labor market participation (Bianchi et al. 2000, Bittman et. al 2003; Brayfield 1992; Brines 1994; Goldscheider and Waite 1991).

The factors associated with an egalitarian management of the household can be considered on two levels. At the micro-level the issue is typically framed in terms of the “implicit contract” between the spouses which is dependent to some extent on their personal attributes and labor market activities. On a broader level family division of labor is addressed in terms of the societal factors that may impact on the organization of the household. These include the relationship between family, market
and state, as well as cultural norms regarding gender and family. The latter concern is best addressed by means of comparative analysis that permits the examination of structural factors associated with different patterns of household organization.

This paper aims to enhance the understanding of the household division of labor and the antecedents of the egalitarian gender regime in several ways: First, by studying the patterns of housework in Germany and Israel we aim to contribute to the small but growing body of research which focuses on the context of gendered division of household labor. Second, we intend to evaluate the time-constraints and the resource-dependence perspectives as well as the gender-role argument concerning housework of working women. Third, by examining both the time devoted to housework and the extent of egalitarian division of daily household tasks we hope to provide a more detailed account of the correlates of the household division of labor.

**Generalized explanations of the division of household labor**

Sociological approaches to the household division of labor can be grouped into two broad classes. One class of explanations is framed in terms of micro-relations and includes several variants of exchange theory which view the actual practices followed by spouses as representing a negotiated agreement which may, or may not, be based in power relations between the spouses (see Becker 1981; McDonald 1981, respectively). A number of approaches that fit under this broad perspective have received detailed exposition and evaluation (Bianchi et al. 2000; Blood and Wolfe 1960; Brines 1994; Horney and McElroy 1988). A second class of explanations is framed in more abstract terms and is represented by the proposition that gender categories are constituted through the actions of individuals and their social relations. Hence, the household division of labor is not merely an agreement struck between two social actors. Rather, the household is the locus of structuration, reflecting gender ideology, socialization, differential power, and at the same time institutionalizing gender distinctions (Berk 1985; Brines 1994; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Hochschild 1989).

**Resource dependence and time constraints**

The resource-dependence perspective suggests that the division of household tasks largely reflects the differential power of the spouses within the household and this in turn is determined by their relative social statuses (Blair and Lichter 1991; Brines
This perspective involves the assumption that spouses prefer not to engage in housework and therefore the spouse that can muster a greater amount of resources or can threaten to withdraw resources in spousal negotiations will carry less of the household burden. To the extent that women are less able than their spouses to secure valuable resources for the household (e.g., income and symbolic rewards) they will carry most of the responsibility of household chores. Recent studies have focused on a particular form of resource-power in which economic dependency is central. This perspective views the division of labor as a function of dependency which “…is best defined in terms of one spouse’s reliance upon the other for his or her current income standard” (Brines 1994:657).

It should be noted that differential resources may also be associated with the specialization framework posited by Becker (1981) according to which the division of household and market work between spouses is negotiated with the aim to maximize family utility. The division of household and market labor, it is argued, reflects rational (family) decision making rather than power disparity. Yet, according to this theory, one would not expect differences in household division of labor that are not accounted for by unequal time spent by spouses in market work.

Market work, of course imposes time constraints on the amount of time available for housework. Hence, the former should be negatively related with the latter, irrespective of resource-dependence (Bittman, et al. 2003). From the perspective of time availability spouses employment patterns may thus have a unique impact on the time they devote to housework, although not necessarily on the division of household chores.

**Gender roles and gender structuration**

While the resource-exchange perspective and its specific derivatives are conceptualized as (gender-neutral) micro-decisions, the second class of arguments can be defined as the gender structuration proposition. In line with Giddens’ epistemology of structuration (Giddens 1976) we view gender relations in society as emerging in the context of structural differentiation and simultaneously contributing to its reproduction. In this context we may think of the social structure as an array of rules and resources (Sewell 1992). The rules derive from routine practices that take on meaning and are legitimized, often abstracted and tied to a value system. Both material and symbolic resources are part of the social system and are used by social
agents to further their goals. Social reproduction is carried out by actions of social agents who are constrained to a degree by existing rules and the resources available to them, but who also have the ability to acquire resources, and to establish new practices that in turn may be institutionalized.

Spouses are likely to bring to the relationship relatively stable attitudes instilled in the process of socialization (Perrucci et al. 1978). They also tend to face different opportunities in the public sphere based on their gender. Concomitantly, the performance of daily activities in the household and the emergent division of labor reproduces gender as a social category and reinforces male and female roles, identities and attitudes. Hence, the division of household labor is not only about productivity but about the “production” of gender and gender relations through “everyday performance” (Batalova and Cohen 2002; see also Berk 1985; Greenstein 2000).

The traditional family model viewed the male’s primary responsibility to provide an income, whereas care for the household and dependents was women’s responsibility. Such segregation of activities inevitably inscribed female dependence as well. With changing patterns of employment and family formation the traditional model has given way to a variety of alternatives and some researchers have predicted growing individualization whereby the male and female roles become ‘de-complementary’ (Burns and Scott 1994) and the family shifts from ‘a community of need’ to ‘an elective relationship’ (Beck-Gernsheim 2002). Yet, most families in Western industrialized societies combine aspects of equality as well as segregation.

To the extent that the household remains a locus of gender-role production, we might expect that the gender division of household labor would not be fully accounted for by the resource-dependence relations or by time constraints. Such gender distinctions would most likely materialize in the division of responsibilities for household chores rather than in the time spent on housework. Furthermore, such gender distinctions should be related to more general attitudes toward gender roles held by the spouses.

The relevance of societal context
Literally dozens of studies have addressed the issue of gender division of labor and especially the extent to which women’s housework has changed in recent decades. Yet, comparative research which examines gendered patterns of household work across countries is rather sparse. Although, in the past decade, a number of studies
have compared the level of household work across countries and the extent to which it is egalitarian, this effort is still in the early stages of conceptual theoretical development. The rationale for comparative analysis was succinctly described over a decade ago by Kalleberg and Rosenfeld (1990) who pointed out that “… differences in how men and women are able to integrate these two kinds [labor market and family] of work may reflect national variations in macroscopic institutions, labor markets, culture, and …. policies designed to integrate family and work roles” (p. 334).

In line with the above view, a number of studies have compared the patterns of household division of labor in Scandinavia and North America and Australia. The underlying proposition in all these studies was that systemic differences among countries impact on the gender division of household work and its relationship to labor market activity. Kalleberg and Rosenfeld (1990), who conducted one of the earliest studies along these lines, pointed out that social policies in Sweden and Norway reflected the egalitarian ideology that characterizes these societies and were more coherent than policies in the United States and Canada, societies in which individual freedom and self-sufficiency were strongly emphasized. Based on a model that estimated the reciprocal effects of women’s household responsibilities and employment patterns, Kalleberg and Rosenfeld concluded that in the Scandinavian countries the former affected the latter whereas the opposite was true for the United States. These differences correspond to the fact that social policies in the Scandinavian countries differ from those in the United States in that they aim to facilitate the integration of market and household work whereas in the latter they focus more exclusively on the labor market.

Adopting a socialist-feminist perspective, Calasanti and Bailey (1991) examined a subset of the above countries - Sweden and the United States - and argued that they represent different forms of patriarchal capitalism. Although both societies are characterized by market economies, in Sweden extensive welfare and family oriented policies mitigate some of the harsher aspects of patriarchy and help women balance the demands in the public and private spheres. Consistent with these arguments the authors found that economic power in the family was a more important determinant of household work in the United States than in Sweden. Recently, Evertsson and Nermo (2004) re-visited the two societies and extended the investigation over several time periods. In contrast to Calasanti and Bailey (1991)
they found that the economic dependence proposition received consistent support in the Swedish case while in the United States they found a curvilinear relationship between economic dependence and the time female spouses spent on housework. They interpret this result as support for the ‘doing gender’ proposition according to which females’ actions in the household are governed more by gender-role schemata than by the relative resources of the spouses. Since this finding is quite different from that reported in other studies (e.g. Baxter 1997) and since the situation of relative dependence of the male spouse on the female is rather rare, it is quite difficult to accept these findings as indication of the mechanism of gender structuration within the household.

Investigating the very same countries as Kalleberg and Rosenfeld, with the addition of Australia, Baxter (1997) posited that gender equality in society at large (in the economic and political spheres) should be associated with more egalitarian patterns of housework. Although the macro-micro links were not fully specified by Baxter, several mechanisms are likely to be involved. First, greater visibility of women in elite positions may serve to empower women and alter their beliefs regarding gendered division of labor. Indeed, this proposition was tested by Batalova and Cohen (2002) in a cross-national study of cohabitating couples in 22 countries. Employing hierarchical linear modeling they found a significant albeit weak effect of the proportion of women in elite positions on the division of labor across countries. In addition, greater gender equality in the public sphere affected the division of household work by altering the extent of women’s economic dependency and the relative time constraints faced by the spouses (when both take part in labor market activity).

A second proposition offered by Baxter (1997) suggested that cross-national variation in household division of labor would be related to the implementation of welfare programs aimed at alleviating conflicting demands of home and work. Specifically she suggested that implementation of such programs in Scandinavia (most notably in Sweden) have made possible greater gender equality within the household. In this respect, it is not immediately clear why policies which aim to facilitate women’s employment – extensive child-care facilities, flex-time, generous parental leave arrangements – would necessarily increase equality in the household. It is plausible that such policies, while encouraging women to join the labor force also provide the means for women to maintain the primary responsibility for household
work mainly by channeling them to female-type less-demanding occupations, or employment on a part-time basis. Two opposing mechanisms may be at work in this case. Family welfare policies may reduce the dependency of women on their spouses by altering the balance of resources, leading to a more egalitarian organization of the household. At the same time policies that encourage women’s labor market participation by integrating family and work activities and reducing women’s time constraints relative to men may actually contribute to greater inequality in the organization of the household, because women are absent from lucrative jobs and higher positions in the labor market (Mandel and Semyonov 2004; Stier and Mandel 2003).

In any case the argument is that a given level of female labor force participation may have different effects on household division of labor depending on the institutional structure supporting women’s employment. However, Baxter (1997) also noted that Scandinavians – both men and women – hold more egalitarian views about gender than men and women in English speaking countries. To the extent that this is true, it would be difficult to isolate the various country level factors (e.g. gender ideology, social policies, etc.) that may impact on differences in the organization of the household.

While most comparative studies have juxtaposed social democratic and liberal market societies, in a recent study Bittman et al (2003) compared the patterns of time devoted to housework from the Australian time-budget study with similar data from the United States. For Australia they reported a curve-linear relationship between the relative earnings of the spouses and women's housework. That is, as the wife’s share of earnings increased, the time she spent on housework tended to decline. Once, however, the wife’s share of earnings reached 50%, the hours of housework tended to increase once again. No such pattern, however, was observed in the United States. The non-linear relationship was interpreted as an instance of ‘gender display’ (Brines 1994). The authors explained the dissimilar response of Australian and American women to greater economic independence in terms of different labor force participation patterns among Australian and American women and associated cultural norms. Australian women, it was argued, devote relatively longer hours to housework in order to “…make up for the[ir] gender deviance of female breadwinning and their husbands’ dependence on this” (Bittman et. al 2003: 207). The authors interpreted these findings as empirical support for the “gender role” hypothesis which posits that
the division of household labor is not merely a negotiated social arrangement that balances market and family inputs of the spouses. Rather, household division of labor is constitutive in that it structures gender categories as household goods and services are being produced.

The German and Israeli Settings

Much of the comparative research on household division of labor has been framed in terms of differences stemming from the social context of diverse welfare regimes. Most notably, the peculiarities of the social-democratic and the liberal welfare regimes have provided fertile grounds for hypotheses concerning gender equality in general and gender relations in the household specifically. The rationale guiding the present study aims to move beyond the welfare regime perspective and to focus more directly on what Crompton (1999) termed ‘gender order’, or ‘gender regime’. The concept of gender order is premised on the idea that gender relations are constructed in particular social contexts and that the structuring of these relations are complex as they evolve from a multiplicity of origins. Cultural as well as economic and institutional factors are important constituents. The gender order is pervasive throughout society, but “…the major dimension structuring the gender division of labor has been the gender coding of caring and market work” (Crompton, 1999:204). Hence, societies, for a variety of reasons, might differ in their dominant form of gender organization, ranging from the historic male breadwinner/female carer model to the yet unattained dual earner/dual carer model (Gornick and Meyers 2003).

In view of the conceptualization outlined above Israel and Germany provide a promising and as yet unexplored setting for a comparative study of household division of labor since they have enough in common to provide a basis for comparison and yet they differ in some important respects that make this comparison valuable (Lewin-Epstein, et al. 2000). Both countries are generally speaking, capitalist with fairly extensive welfare systems. Although Israel shares with Germany some key elements of the conservative welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990; Stier et al. 2001), in terms of gender regime the prevailing model in Germany is closer to the male breadwinner/female carer type, whereas Israel might be viewed as fostering a model that lies somewhere between the dual-earner/female part-time carer type and the dual-earner/state carer type.
The extent of female participation in the labor force is quite similar in West Germany and Israel, yet family characteristics and family policy are considerably different. For example, Israel has long established pro-natalist policies that include child allowances, tax deductions in accordance with number of children, and subsidized housing loans for young married couples and single mothers (Doron & Kramer 1992). Indeed, Israel has the highest total fertility rate among the industrialized countries (2.9 for the entire population and 2.6 among Jews). Marriage is universal in Israel, and divorce rates are relatively low (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2002).

Policies have also been established to encourage female employment. These policies, however, are based on the assumption that women maintain primary responsibility for the family. In fact, social and welfare policies seem to promote contradictory goals: both high fertility and female employment. To this end, women are entitled to maternity leave paid by the state, guaranteed re-employment within one year following the birth of a child, shorter working hours with full pay for mothers of young children, and "sick" leave on account of ill children. Most importantly, a fairly extensive kindergarten and day-care system in Israel provides child-care facilities for working women. It is still the case, however, that about one-third of employed women hold part-time jobs.

Germany differs from Israel in family behavior. Figures published in Statistisches Bundesamt (2004) indicate that Germany experienced a dramatic decline in fertility, and household size, and a substantial increase in cohabitation and single parenthood. The age at marriage has gone up, as did the divorce rate (if the current rate continues one third of marriages will end in divorce). At the institutional level, labor market policies in Germany strongly nourish labor market exit and reduced labor supply of female spouses. The same applies to policies concerning provision of child-care and related services. In addition to a lack of affordable care for small and very small children there is a particular shortage in West Germany of day-care institutions which would permit both parents to work full-time. Our own past research has pointed out that women in Israel were more committed to labor market activity than was true for Germany as demonstrated by women’s employment patterns along the life-course (Stier et al. 2001).

In both Germany and Israel, then, family policies are based on the belief that women have primary responsibility for the family. Yet, in Germany welfare and tax
policies uphold the male breadwinner model and are meant to discourage female employment, while in Israel the dual-earner model is adopted and the state intervenes to facilitate females’ combining family and employment responsibilities. Indeed, 70 percent of couple-headed households in Israel have dual earners.

**Hypotheses**
Past research has established the relationship between women’s education, labor market activity, presence of young children and household division of labor. Hence, we start out with the null hypothesis that observed differences between Germany and Israel derive from the particular socio-demographic composition of the two populations (in particular, the extent of labor market activities). Our alternative hypothesis is that other things being equal Israeli women spend less time than German women in housework and their division of labor is more egalitarian. Concomitantly, Israeli men are expected to allocate more of their time to housework activities. This proposition stems from the different societal views of women’s roles. The dual breadwinner model which characterizes Israeli policies is likely to legitimate less effort in housework.

Regarding the effect of time availability, our discussion of the German and Israeli social contexts indicated that labor market and family policies in Israel aim to facilitate the integration of work and family responsibilities, especially where mothers are concerned. In Germany, labor market policies are largely based on the male breadwinner model. Consequently, we expect a stronger relationship among German women than Israeli women between the extent of labor market employment and time spent on housework. Additionally, in Israel women’s employment will induce spouses to increase their share of housework and household responsibilities whereas in Germany they will not. We expect, therefore, a stronger relationship in Israel than in Germany between employment and the extent of egalitarian organization of housework.

A further characteristic of dual earner families is the time constraint experienced by both spouses regarding household responsibilities. We propose that in societies that encourage dual earner families, greater use is made of a third party to carry out the household chores. There are two issues of interest in this area. First, the use of a third party may be a culturally sanctioned phenomenon and societies are likely to differ with regard to the prevalence of this phenomenon. Second, at the
individual level we propose that the use of a third party is a solution initiated by 
women in order to (partly) relieve themselves of household chores.\textsuperscript{4} It will therefore 
be related to the extent of women’s employment and their relative earnings’ 
dependence. We intend therefore to examine to what extent Germany and Israel use a 
third party in housework and its effect on the division of household labor in the two 
countries.

The presence of children generally increases the total amount of housework, 
over and above the added responsibilities of childcare. The question then is how this 
increase in overall household activities is divided among the spouses. \textit{We hypothesize that when children are present Israeli men will increase their share of housework more than German men.} The former favor relatively large families and share with 
women a child-centered ideology. The adherence to the male breadwinner model in 
Germany fosters the expectation that women will reduce their labor market activities 
when there are children present in the household; thus, there is no perceived need for 
men to increase the time they spend doing household chores.

The relative resource proposition (at times referred to as the power-bargaining 
hypothesis) has been a central component of the sociological study of household 
division of labor (Baxter 1997; Calasanti and Bailey 1991). One argument that 
follows from this proposition is that in societies with strong family oriented policies, 
the extent of wives’ economic dependence will have a weaker effect on the division of 
housework than in societies with more pronounced market ideologies. Germany and 
Israel do not differ much with regard to their welfare regime, yet Israel places 
stronger emphasis on women’s employment. \textit{Thus, we expect a stronger effect of relative resources in Israel than in Germany.} However, a second argument has 
related the effect of relative resources to the normative behavior of women. In 
societies where women’s employment (especially full-time employment) is not the 
norm we are likely to encounter “gender display” in the form of employed women 
taking greater responsibility for housework. This is typical of the male breadwinner 
regime. \textit{Specifically, we expect that in Germany with its male breadwinner model,}

\textsuperscript{4} There are two additional mechanisms that can be used to reduce the time needed for housework: 
reducing the standards and increasing efficiency. Unfortunately, we are unable to measure these 
alternative explanations.
educated women and/or those who earn as much as their spouses will “compensate” by doing a greater share of the household work.

Data and Measurement

Data Sources

In order to examine the hypotheses outlined in the previous section we make use of recently released data sets from the survey of Family and Gender Roles conducted in Germany and in Israel as part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The survey was conducted in 2002 and questionnaires were administered to full probability samples of the population age 18 and over. While a large part of the questionnaire addressed family and gender related attitudes, it also included factual information on the division of household labor and the amount of time spent on housework. Detailed socio-demographic information was also collected including marital status, household composition, education and employment status. For couples living together, background data as well as factual information on housework was collected (by proxy) on both spouses.

In Germany data were collected from 1367 individuals (68 percent of them in former West Germany and the remainder from former East Germany). In Israel the sample included 1207 individuals (1018 From the Jewish population and 189 from the Arab population). Since the Arab population is socially and culturally very different from the Jewish population and since the sample size was too small to analyze separately the present study includes only the Jewish population.

Since all respondents provided detailed background and employment information for spouse as well as themselves, it was possible to construct a “couples” file so that information was provided on wife’s and husband’s characteristics and on household arrangements. Hence, we excluded from the dataset all households that did not include a heterosexual couple (either married or living together). We also excluded all couples comprised of two persons who were above the age of 65 due to the fact that a major aspect of the gendered division of household work has to do with its relationship to labor market activity. As a result of the above decisions we were left with 815 couples in Germany and 613 couples in Israel. The fact that we ended up

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5 Since the population of former East Germany was over-represented in the sample (it actually comprises approximately 18 percent of the German population) we weighted the German sample prior to carrying out the analysis.
with a relatively small gap in the number of couples for Germany and Israel even though we started out with very different sample sizes attests to the large difference in household structure between the two societies. A larger proportion of Israeli adults have a conjugal living arrangement.

Variables and Measurement

Three dependent variables capture the division of household labor. The extent of segregation in household labor, or, conversely, the extent of spousal sharing in household tasks, is measured as the average of responses to four items that represent major tasks of daily household maintenance – doing laundry, cleaning, preparing meals and shopping. The scale for each item ranges from 1 (only wife is responsible for the activity) to 5 (only husband is responsible for the activity)\(^6\). The lower the score on the combined measure, the more female-centered is the arrangement of housework.\(^7\) Two additional variables measure, separately, the total number of hours per week spent on housework by the wife and the husband.

The central independent variables are spouses’ time availability and their relative resources. We employ two measures for relative resources. Following Brines (1994) we measured income dependency of wives as the difference between the spouses’ relative contribution to the family income, as can be seen in the following formula:

\[ Depinc = \left(\frac{\text{earnh}}{\text{earnh} + \text{earnw}}\right) - \left(\frac{\text{earnw}}{\text{earnh} + \text{earnw}}\right) \]

Where \(\text{earnh}\) refers to husband’s earnings and \(\text{earnw}\) indicates wife’s earnings.

A second measure of relative resources pertains to spouses’ education. We constructed four dummy variables indicating whether the wife has higher education than her spouse; whether the husband has higher education; whether both have high school or lower education, and whether both have post-secondary education (the reference category).

Time availability was measured by wife and husband’s weekly working hours, and by the presence of children in the household. The latter was indicated by two

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\(^6\) A sixth category noted that a third person was mostly responsible for the task. In this case the value was recoded to represent equal responsibility of the spouses and a dummy variable was created, indicating whether a third person was responsible for any household task.

\(^7\) Very high scores on the measure would indicate that most tasks are the responsibility of male spouse. Since such instances are rather rare and the scores are generally quite low, indicating that female spouses are mostly responsible for the household tasks, we interpret higher scores as more egalitarian household arrangements.
dummy variables: whether children younger than six years of age are present and whether children aged 6 to 17 are present (‘no children younger than 18 in the household’ is used as the reference category). In line with our expectation regarding the use of a third party as a strategy to increase equality in housework, we also added a dichotomous variable indicating whether any of the household tasks included in the measure of the household division of labor is done by a third party.

Gender role attitudes of respondents are included in the analysis since they present a direct, if limited, measure of the household gender ideology. The scoring of gender role attitudes is based on the degree of agreement with the following statements: “A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works”, “All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job”, “A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children”, “Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay”, and “A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family”\(^8\). The answers ranged from 1- strongly agree to 5- strongly disagree. The mean score was calculated for the 5 items so that a high score on the combined measure represents a more egalitarian disposition. The inclusion of this construct in the analysis also serves as a control, since we aim to examine the effect of education as a resource in the relationship between spouses rather than an indicator of “enlightenment”. Finally, all our models control for age and sex\(^9\) of respondent (the latter variable serves as a control for possible biases in reporting the housework measures).

**Findings**

We begin our analyses by presenting the distribution of the three housework measures in Israel and Germany. The figures, presented in the upper panel of Table 1 reveal important differences between the two countries: In general, Israeli couples are somewhat more egalitarian than German households as revealed by the higher scores on the index measuring task sharing in the household. The mean scores are 2.16 and 2.03 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, for the two countries respectively. The difference is significant at the level of \(\alpha=0.05\). This difference may result from a greater

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\(^8\) Exploratory factor analysis revealed that all five items score highly and approximately equally on one factor. Only respondents (and not their spouses) were presented with the attitude items, so that we take the derived scores to measure the gender ideology that characterizes the household

\(^9\) The interview was conducted with one person in the household. Hence, the division of household labor was typically reported by one of the spouses (wife or husband). In order to control for possible gender differences in reporting we control for sex in all the analyses.
tendency of Israeli men to take a more active part in housework; yet, it may also reflect a greater tendency of Israeli households to relegate housework to a third person (as will be discussed subsequently).

Israeli women and men invest fewer hours in housework than their German counterparts. We will come back to this finding in a later section, but at this point it noteworthy that the average amount of time spent by an Israeli woman is less than 17 hours a week compared to almost 20 hours for German women. The difference between men in the two countries is not as great (5.95 and 7.14 for Israeli and German men, respectively) but is statistically significant nonetheless. In both countries men’s hours devoted to housework are by far fewer than the number of hours allocated by women.10

In accordance with the different amounts of time German and Israeli couples spend jointly on housework (an average of 27 and 23 hours per week, respectively) we also find that Israeli couples are much more likely than their German counterparts to have a third person responsible for at least one of the major household chores. The difference between the two countries is remarkable; 20 percent of the couples in Israel reported that a third person was responsible for at least one of the major household chores, whereas only 4 percent reported so in Germany. Given the generally larger households that characterize Israeli society one might contend that the third person is likely to be a family member such as an older child or a parent of the one of the spouses. Yet, recent findings from the Social Survey conducted by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics reported that 23 percent of married Jewish respondents hired household help (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2002). These figures, then, appear to reflect a real social-cultural difference in the organization of the household in the two countries and may mediate the relationship between the market position of the spouses and the division of household labor.

10As can be determined from the table below, in both Germany and Israel the estimated number of hours female spouses devote to housework is approximately three time greater than the time devoted by male spouses. The estimates are quite similar whether reported by the respondent or the spouse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>reference person</th>
<th>Germany respondent</th>
<th>Israel respondent</th>
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<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spouse</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Why do Israeli women and men invest fewer hours in housework and why is housework more segregated in Germany? One possible answer is that the two countries differ in important socio-demographic characteristics which usually affect couples’ housework. The lower panel of Table 1 presents the demographic characteristics as well as household attributes and gender-role attitudes for the two populations. Meaningful differences between German and Israeli married populations are clearly evident. Israelis are significantly more educated than Germans – the mean number of years of schooling in Israel exceeds 13 years compared to fewer than 12 years in Germany. Concomitant with the educational differences, Israeli women are more likely to be in the labor force than German women; two thirds of the former are in the labor force compared to 51 percent of the latter. Israeli couples are more likely to have children at home and they are slightly younger than German couples in the study. Two additional characteristics for which information is available are the extent of the wives’ economic dependence on the husband and the gender role attitudes of respondents in the two countries. As is evident from the mean figures in Table 1, Wives’ economic dependence is greater in Germany than in Israel (0.37 as compared to 0.27). On the gender role attitudes scale which ranges from 1 to 5, the mean score is 3.20 and 3.39 for Israel and Germany, respectively. While this difference is rather small it is statistically significant, nonetheless.

We start out by testing whether the demographic differences between the two populations account for the observed differences in household division of labor. The findings are presented in Table 2. In the left-most column we present the results of a model that includes only a country indicator variable. The coefficient is negative and significant indicating that responsibility for household chores is less egalitarian in Germany than in Israel. After controlling for education and labor market involvement of the spouses (column 2) the differences in the division of household labor are effectively removed, suggesting that the gross disparity between the countries reflected primarily compositional differences. Turning now to the time spent on housework, the original values (hours per week) were transformed by taking the natural log (ln) of each value. This procedure has the added advantage that the regression coefficients can be interpreted as the proportional change in time spent on housework resulting from a unit change in a given predictor variable.

The results of the analysis reveal differences in women’s time allocation to housework in Germany and Israel. The gap is reduced when controlling for education
and labor market activity (columns 3 and 4) although the country effect remains statistically significant. That is, on average, Israeli women spend less time on housework than similarly educated German women with comparable employment status. Lastly, demographic characteristics of the German and Israeli populations do not account for the higher number of hours German men devote to housework. The country coefficient in this case remains unaltered after taking account of the education and employment patterns in the two countries.

Although gross country differences in female household work decline or even fade away when demographic composition is taken into account, it may still be the case that the effects of spouses’ characteristics and resources on time allocation differ between the countries. In the following analysis, therefore, we test several hypotheses regarding the effects of time availability and relative resources on the household division of labor in Germany and Israel. Results from OLS regression analyses are presented in Table 3. The analysis covers three areas – Task sharing, the amount of time spent by the female spouse on housework, and the amount of time spent by the husband on housework. The latter two variables were measured as the number of weekly hours typically devoted to household chores, excluding child care.

**Task Sharing in the Household**

The ‘availability’ of spouses is known to be an important determinant of the organization of household work. The analysis of the extent of sharing in household chores in Israel and Germany (Table 3, first two columns) reveals that the amount of time women spend in market work has a positive and significant effect on the sharing of responsibility for essential household tasks. The effect, as measured by the regression coefficient, appears to be stronger in Israel than in Germany (b = 0.01 and b = 0.005, respectively). By way of contrast, the number of hours spent by the husband in market work has the opposite effect: longer hours in market work are associated with greater segregation in household tasks as men are less likely to share in major household chores. In this case the effect is somewhat weaker in Israel (b = -0.004) than in Germany (b = -0.006) and only marginally significant in the case of the former.

Although the household chores that constitute the measure of task sharing do not include childcare, one might expect that the presence of children would generally increase the load of housework (e.g. cleaning, laundry, meal preparation, etc.) and
may also alter the division of labor between the spouses. Yet, results of the analysis for Israel indicate that the presence of young children does not seem to affect the extent of spousal sharing in household responsibilities. In Germany, however, the presence of children age 6-17 in the household appears to shift the balance to greater female responsibility for housework \((b = -0.129)\). It is also noteworthy that third person responsibility for at least some household chores has a positive effect on spousal task sharing. This results primarily from the fact that the presence of a third person reduces the responsibility of the wife for some household chores, thus producing a more balanced division of labor between the spouses. One may conclude, with regard to the extent of segregation in household labor, that the time availability argument has some merit in both Germany and Israel, although in the latter the presence of children had no added effect.

In order to evaluate the extent to which the relative resources of the spouses affect the extent of gender segregation in household chores we included two measures of the former – the relative income dependence of the female spouse and the educational gap between the spouses. In neither Israel nor Germany does there appear to be an effect of relative resources on the division of responsibility for household work between the spouses. Earnings’ dependency has no significant effect in either country\(^{11}\), although in Germany, but not in Israel, education has some effect on the division of responsibility. When both spouses have low levels of education, spouses are less likely to share the responsibility for household chores (negative regression coefficients) as compared to couples with higher levels of education. Since it is not the relative educational achievements of the spouses, but rather the couple’s educational level, that is associated with the gender task segregation we tend to attribute this difference to cultural differences associated with lower education which apparently are not captured by our measures of gender.

The latter interpretation is upheld by the positive and significant relationship between gender-role attitudes and the organization of household labor. In both Israel

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\(^{11}\) Several studies in the past have added to the estimation equations the square of income dependence, in order to model its curvilinear relationship with the household division of labor. The theoretical argument for the concave relationship is that as the dependence relationship shifts from wives’ income dependence to the income dependence of the husbands’, wives will take on greater household responsibility in order to safeguard the gender identity of the male spouse. This ‘gender display’ is viewed by some researchers (e.g., Evertsson and Nermo 2004) as evidence of gender construction in the household. We examined this possibility in all our models but the effect of the square term was never statistically significant. Nonetheless, as discussed in the text, we find support for the notion of the household as a locus of gender construction in other empirical relationships.
and Germany more liberal gender role attitudes are associated with greater sharing of household responsibility. This relationship, it should be emphasized, holds even when controlling for level of education and earnings dependence and appears to reflect a genuine pattern. Additional support for this interpretation might be derived from the negative association between age and spousal sharing of household tasks. Although when interpreting the effects of age on the basis of cross-sectional data one is faced by the confluence of maturation, period and cohort effects, the observed results are aligned with the inference of shifting household gender ideology. That is, younger generations are more liberal than older ones with regard to the gender division of labor in the household.

Time Devoted to Housework
Coefficient estimates for the effects of spouses’ and household characteristics on the time women devote to housework are presented in the third (Israel) and fourth (Germany) columns of Table 3. The time constraint hypothesis posits that the amount of time the wife spends on housework would be inversely related to the time spent in market work and would be positively related to the amount of time devoted to market work by the husband. This hypothesis is not born out in the case of Israel but is confirmed in the case of Germany. Every additional hour of market employment of the German female reduces the time spent on housework by almost one percent (b = -0.009). A woman who is employed an average number of hours (18.25, according to Table 1) is likely to spend 16 percent less time doing housework than a female spouse with similar characteristics who is not employed in the labor market. The time spent by the wife on housework is also affected by the extent of her spouse’s market work since we find a positive and significant relationship (b = 0.003) indicating that every additional hour spent by the husband in market work increases the time spent by the wife on housework, presumably as a result of reduced support from the husband. Although the simple correlation between market and housework calculated for Israeli wives (not shown here) revealed a negative relationship as expected, once other variables are controlled for (primarily earnings dependence) in the regression analysis the relationship is no longer significant.

Other factors associated with time availability also impact on the amount time women spend on housework. The presence of children – pre-school and school-age – in the household increases the time spent on housework regardless of the number of
hours spent in market work in both Israel and Germany, but the effects are somewhat stronger in Israel. On the other hand when a third person is responsible for at least some of the household chores the time wives spend on housework is reduced substantially in the two countries.

Turning to factors associated with resource-dependence, the amount of time women allocate to housework is clearly affected by the couples’ relative resources and this is especially pronounced in the case of Israel. In the Israeli context we find, as anticipated, that education plays a role as a power resource. Women married to husbands who have higher education than their own allocate more of their time to housework compared to highly educated homogeneous couples. Yet, we find that women who have higher education than their spouses also allocate more hours to housework. This finding is contrary to the resource-dependence hypothesis and may represent greater effort on the part of the female spouse safeguard the status of lower educated husband in a form of “gender display”.

As hypothesized by the resource-dependence proposition, earnings dependence has a positive and significant effect on Israeli women’s housework. The greater the dependence, the more hours women spend doing housework. One obtains a clear interpretation of this relationship when focusing on the lower end of this relationship; that is, *ceteris paribus*, when the female is least dependent on her spouse, as measured by the relative earnings gap, she is likely to devote less time to housework than otherwise.

A similar relationship between income dependence and women’s housework, albeit weaker, is found among German couples (*b* = 0.155). Yet, differences in education do not have a similar effect. The only effect of education among German couples is that women are likely to spend more time on housework when both spouses have low education as opposed to high education couples. Since it is not the relative education of the spouses that is related to women’s housework but rather the fact that both have lower education, this may reflect cultural differences associated with lower class position which is expressed in greater conservatism with regard to gender and the family.

Turning to the effects of gender role attitudes and age of respondents, we find that more liberal attitudes are associated with fewer hours spent by the wife on housework. While the relationship is statistically significant in both Israel and Germany the relationship is substantially stronger in Israel (*b* = -0.170 and *b* = -0.075
in the two countries, respectively). The effect of age, however, is of similar magnitude in both countries indicating that in households with older respondents, women spend more time in housework. Indeed, every additional year of age is associated with an increase of over one percent on average in the workload \((b = 0.013)\). We may conclude that in both countries the relative external resources available to the spouses directly affects women’s housework. In Israel this affect appears to dominate in that we did not find significant support for the time constraint hypothesis. In Germany, on the other hand, both mechanisms appear to be at work.

Turning now to husbands’ contribution to housework, we generally find that the models do substantially less well in predicting husbands’ housework than they did in the case of the wives. This is especially true for Germany, where the adjusted \(R^2\) of the model for wives is 0.25 whereas the corresponding statistic for the model predicting husbands’ housework is \(R^2 = 0.05\).

In both Israel and Germany the amount of time husbands spend in market work is negatively associated with time spent in housework \((b = -0.011\) in the case of Israel and \(b = -0.008\) in Germany). In Israel we also find that the extent of husbands’ housework varies more generally in response to the household demands. The time spent on housework by Israeli husbands is positively and significantly affected by the market work of their wives \((b = 0.12)\); that is, husbands respond to their spouses market activity by increasing their own contribution to housework. In Israel husbands’ hours of housework are also positively affected by the presence of pre-school children. Interestingly, the presence of a third person responsible for at least some portion of household tasks reduces the amount of time spent by Israeli husbands on housework. In this respect the pattern is similar to what we reported earlier in the case of women. Aside from the effects reported above there are no significant effects on husbands’ housework. It appears that neither resource dependence nor gender role attitudes have an effect on the extent of husbands’ contribution to the overall time devoted by spouses to housework.

In Germany the situation is quite different. Except for the observation that men who spend more time in the labor market contribute fewer hours to housework, the estimated model does not provide clues to the variation in the latter among German men. The relative resources of the spouses have no effect on the time husbands’ devote to housework and neither does the presence or absence of children. It is noteworthy in this regard that gender-role attitudes which had strong and
significant effects on the division of household labor and women’s housework is not
statistically related to the time husbands spend on housework neither in Israel nor
Germany.

Summary and Discussion
Prior to addressing the broader significance of the results of this study, let us review
the major findings that emerge from the analysis. We started out with the hypothesis
that the differences in the gender division of household labor between Israel and
Germany are systemic rather than resulting from the dissimilar demographic
composition of the two societies. We posited that the division of labor would be more
egalitarian in Israel and that Israeli women would spend less time in housework than
in Germany, due to the predominance of the dual-earner model in Israeli social
organization of family and work. The results of our analysis provide only partial
support for this hypothesis. Israeli couples (women and men alike) indeed spend less
time doing housework than German couples even after controlling for the
demographic composition of the two societies. Yet, once education and employment
status differences are taken into account there are no country differences in the
reported division of household labor between the spouses.

The division of responsibility for household chores and time spent on
housework are of course related but represent, nonetheless, different aspects of the
gendered household order. Time devoted to housework is responsive to a variety of
factors (including competing activities, time-saving technologies, household needs,
etc.). Hence, in comparing Germany, with its male-breadwinner family model and
Israel, where the dual-earner – part-time carer model is characteristic, the finding that
women in the former spend more time on housework than in the latter is to be
expected. The division of responsibility for household chores, however, represents the
extent to which husbands partake in what were traditionally (and still remain) a
woman’s responsibility. In this sense it touches on the core of the gender order. It is
embedded in broader cultural codes and therefore more resistant to change. As both
Germany and Israel are family oriented societies that uphold the traditional family
model, our findings of similar low levels of sharing responsibility for household
chores in both countries are to be expected.

Time constraints experienced by Israeli women are greater than those faced by
German women. The former are engaged in market work to a greater extent and are
more likely to have children at home. Furthermore, in a society that encourages the dual-earner family model one would expect these factors to impact more forcefully on the organization of housework. This turned out to be the case. Gender division of labor is more strongly affected by women’s market work and the presence of children in Israel than in Germany. As anticipated, we also find a stronger relationship between wives’ market work and husbands’ contribution to housework in Israel. A rather large proportion of Israeli couples also have a third person do at least some of the household chores, whereas in Germany only a minuscule fraction of the couples reported a similar arrangement. It should be noted, however, that although the presence of a third person is associated with a more egalitarian division of household labor in both Germany and Israel, it plays only a minor role in mediating the effect of time-availability and resource-dependence.

In Germany the presence of children in the household generally polarizes the gender division of labor. The extent of sharing in household chores is reduced when children are in the house (but only the coefficient for school-age children is statistically significant) and the amount of time women spend on housework increases. While in Israel the presence of children does not alter the division of responsibility for household chores, the presence of pre-school children in the household has a strong positive effect on the contribution of husbands to housework (in and above time spent on childcare). This finding along with the fact that in Israel, unlike Germany, husbands’ contribution to housework is responsive to the wives’ time constraints, supports our earlier contention regarding the way family and work are organized in the two societies. While Israel and Germany have in common some institutional arrangements as well as cultural norms regarding the family, Israel presents a more radical family model as evident from the responsiveness of husbands to changing family needs, especially those stemming from the presence of children.

Turning now to the impact of resource-dependence, we hypothesized greater dependence in Germany than in Israel, based on the different family-organizing principles in the two societies. We also expected that the effect of resource-dependence on women’s housework would be weaker in Germany, where the male-breadwinner model leaves less room for negotiation. Indeed, as expected, we find that income-dependence is greater in Germany and its impact on the hours wives’ spend on housework is stronger in Israel. Yet, the patterns of relationship between spouses’ educational differences and the gender division of labor are less consistent. Israeli
wives who are less educated than their spouses spend more time doing housework, but so do more educated wives. In Germany, the division of household labor is less favorable to women among low-education spouses as compared to better educated couples and this seems to represent class differences more than anything else. More generally we conclude that while resource-dependence has some effect on the organization of households in the two countries it does not appear to trump other explanations of the household division of labor.

A central finding of the present study is the recurring effect of gender role attitudes on the division of household labor. In both Israel and Germany more egalitarian attitudes are associated with greater sharing of household tasks and with wives’ spending fewer hours doing housework. Interestingly, the time spent by husbands on housework is not affected by respondents’ dispositions. The effect of gender role attitudes on both dependent variables (sharing household tasks and wives’ housework) is stronger in Israel than in Germany and the difference in the magnitude of the coefficients is statistically significant. It seems, that the more traditional family model adhered to in Germany constrains the variation that individuals’ attitudes may engender, whereas in the more radical model of dual-earner – part-time carer endorsed in Israel the gender organization of the household is open to greater negotiation depending (among other things) on the attitude dispositions of the spouses. In this respect our findings negate the assertion of Evertsson and Nermo (2004) regarding the (lack of) importance of gender role attitudes, and we propose that such attitudes should be investigated more closely, especially in societies that uphold more traditional family orders.

The findings of this study, contribute, we believe, to the growing corpus of cross-national research on the division of household labor. Much of this research focused on the issue of resource-dependency and its effect on gender inequality in the context of diverse welfare regimes (Baxter 1997; Bittman et al 2003; Brines 1994; Evertsson and Nermo 2004). The results of these studies led to the conclusion that resource-dependence of wives is associated with their carrying a greater burden of housework. Considerable effort was expended in developing theoretical arguments concerning the differential effects of welfare regimes not only on the magnitude of gender inequality, but on the relationship between market work and the organization of the household. Yet, as Baxter concluded from a five-country study - including Sweden, Norway, the United States, Canada and Australia - “…the division of
housework and the factors predicting participation in housework remains remarkably stable across all five countries.”

Several scholars have posited the distinction between the social democratic welfare regime (epitomized by Sweden) and the liberal welfare regime (epitomized by the United States) as a major determinant of societal differences in household division of labor (Baxter 1997; Calasanti and Bailey 1991; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Kalleberg and Rosenfeld 1990). It should be noted, however, that while these models of social organization represent different approaches to commodification and decommodification, both utilize gender neutralizing mechanisms, either via the market or the state apparatus, in order to do away with gender inequality. From this vantage point Sweden and the U.S. – countries that typify two distinctly different welfare regimes - are not that different with regard to the family-gender order they promote (Crompton 1999). Both systems encourage dual-earner families and have developed institutional devices (either state or market) to foster women’s careers.

It is with respect to identifying the social forces underlying the household division of labor that the present study departs from much of past comparative research on the household division of labor as it aims to examine similarities and differences in countries that have comparable welfare regimes. We argue that decommodification policies associated with different types of welfare regimes are only one possible source of influence on the gender organization of the household. Normative precepts that buttress the gender order are another source, and by focusing on countries with fairly similar welfare regimes their nuanced effects were revealed.

Half a decade ago Crompton (1999) suggested a continuum of gender relations ranging from the male-breadwinner/female-carer model to the dual-earner/dual carer model, as an organizing construct for comparing gender systems. Yet, her proposal only briefly sketched the substantive differences between them. The present study, we believe, makes a twofold contribution to this endeavor by focusing on countries that have been rarely studies in cross-national research. First, we delineated the characteristic household division of labor in welfare states that uphold rather traditional values; and second, we highlighted the differences in household division of labor that are associated with different models of the family-work nexus. While the lion’s share of housework in both societies is still performed by women, our findings give support to Crompton’s (1999) argument regarding the cultural structuration of
the gender division of labor and emphasize the importance of culture in determining the level of equality within the housework.
References


Table 1. Distribution of Housework Measures and Selected Independent Variables in Israel and Germany (Means and percents, standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable description</th>
<th>Israel¹</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Measures of Household Labor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division of household labor</td>
<td>Primary responsibility for laundry, cleaning, meals and shopping</td>
<td>2.16 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s household hours</td>
<td>Number of hours spent on housework per week</td>
<td>16.76 (13.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s household hours</td>
<td>Number of hours spent on housework per week</td>
<td>5.95 (6.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third person</td>
<td>A third person is responsible for at least one major household task</td>
<td>0.21 (0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Demographic Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s education</td>
<td>years of schooling</td>
<td>13.65 (3.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s education</td>
<td>years of schooling</td>
<td>13.77 (3.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wives in the labor force</td>
<td>Whether or not the wife is in the labor force</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husbands in the labor force</td>
<td>Whether or not the husband is in the labor force</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wives’ time spent in employment</td>
<td>The number of hours in the labor market per week</td>
<td>22.72 (18.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husbands’ time spent in employment</td>
<td>The number of hours in the labor market per week</td>
<td>35.24 (23.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children &lt;6 in the Household</td>
<td>a dichotomy coded 1 if yes</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children 6-17 in the Household</td>
<td>a dichotomy coded 1 if yes</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>in years</td>
<td>43.20 (12.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender role attitudes</td>
<td>mean score on 5 items – high score more liberal</td>
<td>3.20 (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s economic dependence</td>
<td>[(Hs income − Wf income)/(Hs income + Wf income)]</td>
<td>0.27 (0.53)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹All differences between Israel and Germany are statistically significant at $\alpha=0.05$ except for husbands labor force participation and age.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Division of Labor</th>
<th>Wife’s Hours in Housework (ln)</th>
<th>Husband’s Hours in Housework (ln)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Effect</td>
<td>Net Effect</td>
<td>Total Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country (1=Germany)</td>
<td>-0.125*</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.254*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s education</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.021*</td>
<td>-0.035*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife’s employment status (1=work)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.280*</td>
<td>-0.390*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s hours of Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.161</td>
<td>1.711</td>
<td>2.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1385</td>
<td>1344</td>
<td>1372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. OLS Regression Coefficients of couples relative resources and time availability on measures of household division of labor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sharing Household Tasks</th>
<th>Wife’s Hours in Housework (ln)</th>
<th>Husband’s Hours in Housework (ln)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time Availability</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s hours of market work</td>
<td>.010* (.002)</td>
<td>.005* (.001)</td>
<td>-.000 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s hours of market work</td>
<td>-.004~ (.002)</td>
<td>-.006* (.001)</td>
<td>-.002 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Attributes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-school children</td>
<td>.040 (.071)</td>
<td>-.093 (.062)</td>
<td>.351* (.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School age children</td>
<td>-.053 (.064)</td>
<td>-.129* (.046)</td>
<td>.237* (.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third person</td>
<td>.322* (.075)</td>
<td>.407* (.103)</td>
<td>-.353* (.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relative Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife more educated</td>
<td>-.085 (.095)</td>
<td>-.091 (.088)</td>
<td>.248* (.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband more educated</td>
<td>-.189~ (.103)</td>
<td>-.112 (.071)</td>
<td>.332* (.130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally low education</td>
<td>-.050 (.069)</td>
<td>-.194* (.060)</td>
<td>.100 (.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earning dependency</td>
<td>-.088 (.071)</td>
<td>-.059 (.052)</td>
<td>.257* (.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender Ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender role attitudes</td>
<td>.147* (.039)</td>
<td>.094* (.025)</td>
<td>-.170* (.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.009* (.003)</td>
<td>-.009* (.002)</td>
<td>.013* (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.942* (.200)</td>
<td>2.335* (.164)</td>
<td>2.272* (.253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1All models control for Respondent’s sex.
* p<0.05
~ p<0.10