The culture of tolerance in diverse societies

Reasonable tolerance

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Education to toleration: some philosophical obstacles and their resolution

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Toleration as a perceptual shift of perspectives

Moral education has played a central role in all major ethical systems of thought from Aristotle to Kant, from the Torah to socialist ideology. Providing the young with moral education is particularly tricky, since moral judgement, and even more so moral behaviour, does not come naturally to human beings. The incorporation of moral values and norms requires a distinctive effort and often calls for overcoming natural inclinations and inborn tendencies. The main business of moral education in its traditional form has been the transmission of a set of principles of conduct, forms of judgement, beliefs and sensibilities deemed by the older generation appropriate, even necessary, for its successors. However, with the rise of liberal culture, moral education has become suspect, and its main tenets are often seen now as incompatible with the overall normative scepticism characteristic of this culture. The very right to educate, particularly in the realm of values, has become the object of critical examination. What qualifies parents or the state to decide the values and moral preferences of children and youth? Once moral objectivism or absolutism is abandoned, the grounds for the paternalistic inculcation of moral principles become shaky.

It is therefore typical of contemporary liberal attitude, both on the family level and that of schooling, to reject the traditional, ‘rich’ pattern of moral education. First-order virtues, principles, character traits and values are only cautiously suggested to the child or adolescent, usually as options in a wide repertoire of partly competing values and principles. The traditional commitment to such first-order moral values is characteristically replaced by the dominant effort to promote second-order values, most conspicuously autonomy, critical thinking, respect and tolerance. Moral training is accordingly seen primarily in terms of the capacity to make meaningful choices in one’s life (self-critical exercise of autonomy), on the one hand, and the ability to live side by side with people who have different, often incompatible, values and life styles from our own (respect and tolerance), on the
other. Beyond the implementation of the fundamental norms of social behaviour, the principal goal of moral education in liberal society is thus the creation of conditions for dealing with the absence of common standards and a shared commitment to the good in society.

To our liberal sensibility implanting the value of autonomy and tolerance seems to be a more minimal and hence an easier task than creating an all-round moral personality. However, there are particular difficulties, both conceptual and practical, in liberal education, and there is a strong analogy between the difficulties involved in teaching people to be autonomous and bringing them up on the idea of tolerance. The present chapter will focus on the problems of education to toleration. Its aim is primarily philosophical, that is, to expose the elusive nature of the very idea of toleration and its implications in education and to discuss some psychological and practical obstacles in educating the young to adopt a tolerant attitude to others.

The fundamental theoretical difficulty I am thinking of is associated with the well-known ‘paradox of toleration’. Strictly speaking, tolerance is the attitude of restraint in responding to morally wrong beliefs and practices. Furthermore, as some philosophers insist, the ‘nuclear’ concept of tolerance is applicable only in situations in which the beliefs and practices are held as really, that is objectively, wrong, not only subjectively resisted or detested by the tolerant subject.1 Put bluntly, the principle of tolerance calls upon us to tolerate the intolerable. Tolerant forbearance from a negative response stands in direct conflict with the judgement that the tolerated belief or practice is morally repugnant, obnoxious or wrong. How can we justify the abstention from acting against moral wrongs? And when we come to the sphere of education, how can we hope to raise a child to become a person committed to moral values, yet at the same time willing to tolerate their infringement?

One way to avoid the paradox of toleration is to relax the stringent conditions in the definition of the concept itself. Thus, toleration would characterise restraint in our response to beliefs and practices that we hold to be legitimate even though contrary to our own views. Such a concept of toleration is typical of value pluralism: we refrain from persecuting other religions, from hindering the life plans that look to us wasteful and silly, or from trying to convince people that their aesthetic tastes are cheap, since we recognise them as legitimate even if wrong in our eyes or lacking in value. Pluralism has many versions: there is moral pluralism of the kind Isaiah Berlin (probably on the basis of J. S. Mill’s view) has eloquently advocated; there is religious pluralism of the type developed in Locke’s famous Letters on Toleration, according to which even if there is religious truth it cannot be established with certainty, let alone enforced on those who do not accept it; there is the pluralism of tastes and preferences that belongs to the aesthetic and personal realm to which our moral values are conflated. But what is common to all these versions is that the toleration they call for is always justified by some form of denial or weakening of the objective
moral wrongness of the tolerated belief or conduct. Educating people to
realise the plurality of values and preferences and teaching them to respond
in a gentle manner to differences is certainly of much value; but it does not
directly address the core of the paradox of toleration.\textsuperscript{2} The difficult cases
of toleration relate to beliefs and values that we know to be morally and
objectively false or even dangerous. The inculcation of a pluralist view calls
for the development of equanimity or even indifference in our response to
other views and lifestyles, or at least of a detached curiosity. Toleration,
on the other hand, is necessarily concerned with suffering; it has a price;
toleration can never arise out of apathy.

Another way to relax the conditions of toleration is by focusing on
its pragmatic nature. Tolerance, according to this approach, is primarily a
political virtue. It brings peace and secures social co-existence in a society
that is split in its moral and religious conceptions. Much of the early history
of toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries appealed to this
concept of toleration as compromise. We are willing to put aside our com-
mitment to our moral beliefs, not because we think there are other legiti-
mate options, but because we know there is no other way to maintain social
stability. The call for mutual toleration between orthodox and secular Jews
in Israel is typically guided by this idea of mutual concession rather than
by that of mutual recognition.\textsuperscript{3} And again, there is nothing wrong in such
a political principle of pragmatic reconciliation. However, it again does not
capture the core idea of toleration. Furthermore, as an educational ideal,
compromise misses an important dimension in our relation to those who
are seriously different from us, since by its nature it is guided by \textit{ad hoc}
considerations of relative power and by circumstantial social goals that
justify the concessions involved in every compromise. The principle of tol-
eration we are trying to articulate is a typically principled attitude, a virtue
that is not based on epistemological or pragmatic considerations that are
by definition contingent.\textsuperscript{4}

I therefore suggest focusing on toleration as a principled forbearance
from a negative interference in beliefs and actions that are thought of as
(objectively) morally objectionable. Tolerated phenomena lie between that
which should never be tolerated (violence or cruelty) and that which should
not be objected to in the first place (racial differences or sexual inclina-
tions). My own suggestion as to how to conceptualise and justify tolera-
tion might be called perceptual.\textsuperscript{5} According to this view, toleration involves
a perceptual shift in the way we look at a situation. Roughly speaking, we
can either turn our attention to the belief or act in question and judge them
on their merit, that is impersonally; or, alternatively, we can focus on the
subject of the belief or the agent of the action and judge \textit{them} as holding
the belief or acting on their values, that is to say personally. I would like
to claim that the two perspectives of judgement are separate, irreducible
and often mutually exclusive. The perceptual shift from one perspective to
the other may be compared to the \textit{Gestalt} switch of the rabbit–duck type.
One can choose to see either a rabbit or a duck, but never both at once. One is usually inclined to see the one, but can train oneself or make an effort to see the other. Neither image is more valid or true than the other. Furthermore, as in a Gestalt shift, there is no direct balancing of reasons of the two kinds that makes one perspective superior to the other – only a general, second-order reason to switch from one point of view to the other.

Now, toleration means the shift from the impersonal perspective to the personal. Rather than judging the beliefs or actions in themselves, the tolerant party is considering the subject or agent behind them, the way the beliefs were formed, the manner in which they cohere together in a system of beliefs or constitute a life plan of an individual. According to this personal analysis, both the subject and the object of toleration must be human beings. Consequently, the state (at least in the modern, impersonal conception) cannot be said (strictly speaking) to be tolerant. It can be just and neutral, but it does not suffer or restrain itself from acting on what it deems right and just. Similarly, we tolerate people but not actions and opinions (despite ordinary parlance).

It is thus natural that most (though by no means all) accounts of toleration as a principled attitude refer to autonomy and respect as the ultimate grounds for tolerant restraint: these are in the terms I am suggesting the justification for the intentional abandonment of the judgemental perspective of beliefs and actions as such. Unlike the rabbit–duck case, the two competing perspectives are not symmetrical. At least in some circumstances, there are good moral reasons for adopting the personal view. Many philosophers appeal to personal autonomy as the ultimate basis for the superiority of the personal to the impersonal perspective. Another view, which has received only little attention in the literature on toleration, is viewing it as supererogatory. But in any case, the common underlying reason for switching to the personal point of view is that beyond our interest in truth and goodness in the abstract, we are often more interested in the way these are achieved and sustained by actual human beings. The validity of beliefs and values may be judged independently of their subjects, but their value for us is dependent on the way they cohere in a particular system of beliefs, the process by which they were acquired, the degree to which their subjects are committed to them. These are issues, to which much of the literature on toleration is devoted, but which lie beyond the scope of the present chapter. Our concern here is educational.

By separating two incompatible perspectives, the perceptual model suggested here may solve the conceptual paradox of toleration. There is no contradiction between judging an action as wrong and yet appreciating or respecting its agent (and of course no contradiction between loathing a person and yet at the same time judging one of his actions as right and just). But this does not diminish the difficulties in training people to acquire the ability to make the right shift in the right circumstances. For instance, we know that, in the realm of science, the impersonal perspective is the correct
one, and that judging scientific statements about the world in terms of the
history of their formation in the subject holding them or in terms of the
way they fit with other beliefs of that subject is a fallacy (as, for instance,
in the case of *ad hominem* arguments). Similarly, court judges are usually
called to judge the case brought before them on its merits, that is, in imper-
sonal terms; their job is exactly to decide whether an action was right
or wrong, legal or illegal. However, psychologists are usually expected to
adopt the personal point of view, to turn their attention away (even when
it takes a special effort) from the inclination to judge the substantive worth
of a person’s behaviour. Similarly, in the moral sphere, forgiveness is a
typical example in which we turn a blind eye to the insulting or offensive
act itself and focus on the character of the agent, the previous friendly rela-
tions with her and her repentance for the wrong act. Toleration belongs to
this category of actions, in which the personal autonomy and the respect
for the individual forming a meaningful life for herself are the grounds for
the shift of attention from the judgemental, impersonal perspective to the
personal.

It should, however, be noted that the ability to keep agent separate from
deeds may come under particular strain when a good deal of the agent’s
actions are wrong or some of her actions are extremely repugnant. For the
identity of agents is to a large extent dependent on their actions. Thus, we
may forgive or tolerate a friend’s misbehaviour as long as there remains
enough in her character and record to justify the friendship. But once the
behaviour reflects a major change in personality (for example, the person
becoming a racist, a child abuser, etc.), it is no more the ‘same’ person with
whom we had a relationship of friendship. This is exactly where the separ-
rability of agent from action becomes impossible and we refer to the wrong
action as ‘unforgivable’ or ‘intolerable’.

The difficulties in inculcating toleration in children

Children find such a separation of the personal from the impersonal diffi-
cult. On the one hand, they tend to view individual persons as constituted
by their particular actions and beliefs; on the other hand, they judge the
validity of beliefs and actions in terms of their attitude towards the individ-
ual holding them. Thus, children are even more prone than adults to *ad
hominem* arguments or to arguments from authority. Accordingly, they are
less capable both of impersonal objective judgement and of forgiveness and
tolerance. This double deficiency defines the challenge of moral education
in general and education to toleration in particular. Moral education aims
to instil three capacities: first, the capacity to make normative judgements
about beliefs and practices *in abstracto*; secondly, the capacity to relate
to moral agents independently of their particular views or conduct; and
thirdly, the capacity to distinguish between the contexts in which each of
these perspectives should be adopted. Much of the literature on moral edu-
cation deals with the development of the moral judgement of the child – that is to say, with the first perspective. Children gradually learn to detach the evaluation of states of affairs (typically, distributions) from the natural first-person bias. By that they internalise the idea of justice and fairness (in a way that is analogous, as Piaget has taught us, to the acquisition of symmetrical thinking in scientific matters, which is equally ‘impersonal’). The inculcation of the second, ‘personal’ perspective is discussed much less. How do we educate people to become forgiving, respectful and tolerant? While the self-regarding second-order value of autonomy is easy for the child to adopt owing to its egocentric nature, the ability to see the other as the subject of such autonomy takes more cognitive and emotional effort. It calls for an attitude that is potentially incompatible both with the child’s first-order beliefs of what is right and wrong and with her self-centred interests.

The widespread strategy of turning the offended child’s attention to the intention or the motive of the offender is a step in the direction of the separation of person from action. ‘He did not mean what he said’, or ‘he only wanted to help you’ are surely effective means of training the child to see beyond the wrongness of the action itself. However, this is still not implanting the virtue of toleration. For these are cases that are conceptually more similar to understanding, excusing, and condoning. These are attitudes that call for a change in one’s judgement of the action itself in the light of a broader view of its circumstances (most ethical theories consider the intention or motive of the action as at least partly relevant to its moral status). Tolerance, in the nuclear sense I am trying to examine here, implies a more radical separation. It requires the complete abandonment of the judgemental perspective, turning a blind eye to a wrong that cannot be mitigated, condoned or excused, but must simply be put aside in favour of an assessment of the individual who happens sincerely to believe otherwise. Tolerance is usually costly: as its etymology intimates, it involves ‘suffering’.9

How does this analysis of the education to toleration work on the political plane, that which transcends responses on the individual level? Structurally, political toleration is associated with the same tension between the commitment of people to their own cultural heritage and identity and their recognition of the legitimacy, even the inherent value, of other cultures. Susan Mendus, following Bernard Williams, argues that toleration in a multicultural society is based neither on the idea of the autonomy of other groups to form their own culture (since the value of autonomy is itself controversial), nor on some notion of cultural relativism. The very comparison between our culture and that of others is not the issue. At most the understanding and ‘recognition’ of other cultures may serve as a source for understanding the limits of justification of our own culture.10 I wish to argue that the tension between loyalty to cultural identity and commitment to democratic citizenship, highlighted by Mendus, is analogous to that between my own concept of truth and value and my respect for other people. Political
toleration thus requires of the child the same feat of abstraction or separation of two incomparable points of view, that is to say, the adoption of a second-order reason for switching from the substantive identification with my group’s values to the political recognition of the idea of equal citizenship, group autonomy, or irreducible plurality of ways of life that can never claim to have ultimate justification as the best or the superior.

A serious problem in the education to tolerance is that the educational relationship itself is often intolerant in its very nature. Even in liberal education based on the ideal of respect for the child, the educator’s role is not a model of toleration. This model has to be imported from other contexts to which the child is exposed. We tolerate other people whose views and practices we find objectionable because we respect their autonomy — that is their capacity and right to make choices and live by them. However, with our children, or pupils, our principal aim is to create this capacity, to form an autonomous personality, and this involves the exercise of paternalistic authority. Exactly because we care so much and feel responsible for their future we do not tolerate the wrong beliefs and conduct of our children or students. An extreme, limiting case, which explains why tolerance is not the attitude we show to the people particularly close to us, is our attitude to ourselves: the reason we cannot be said to tolerate ourselves, is that the separation of action from agent, belief from subject, cannot be reflexively applied. We simply cannot view ourselves as distinct from what we do. The intimate proximity of personhood to its particular manifestation in action and belief is most conspicuous in first-person contexts. But it is also typical of the way young children view others. However, though the idea of forgiving or tolerating oneself is at most metaphorical, forgiving and tolerating others is a great virtue on which we try to bring up the young.

So even if the conceptual analysis of toleration I am suggesting here resolves the paradox of toleration, the psychological obstacles to creating a tolerant inclination in both children and adults are serious. In the same way as the personal and impersonal perspectives are mutually exclusive, so are the judgemental and the tolerant frames of mind or propensities. Even though moral pluralism or scepticism is not equivalent to toleration, as we have argued, they psychologically fit a tolerant attitude, or at least are of no hindrance to such an attitude. But there is a way in which even liberal education aims at the creation of individuals who are strongly committed to some of their beliefs and norms, who are convinced of the superiority of those values that constitute their fundamental life projects. As modern liberals like Joseph Raz have shown, the exercise of autonomy presupposes that the options for choice are genuinely valuable or good. In other words, the goal of moral education consists primarily of the creation of a distinct moral profile. But the deeper the commitment of a person to a set of norms, the more dogmatic she will tend to become and the less tolerant to competing points of view. There is a point in both the accusations of liberals and those of religious fundamentalists: the one group is psychologically
inclined to dogmatic and intolerant attitudes; the other to scepticism, pluralism, and indifference. But of course there is no symmetry between the two: non-liberal systems of values can do without the principle of toleration; they advocate the principle of compromise in its stead, and they do so without compromising in a deep sense their commitment to their normative principles. Yet liberals must incorporate a principled, second-order virtue of toleration, which is a more difficult task, since it conflicts with their first-order moral convictions.

**Toleration versus other second-order responses**

Education to toleration is just one part in the general teaching of second-order moral principles, such as punishment, forgiveness, and compromise, that is to say the correct response to the violation of first-order principles or norms. However, just punishment is itself part of the system of justice and hence can be taught fairly easily (although there is always the need to overcome the natural tendency to vindictive over-punishment, as Locke has taught us). Compromise is incompatible with a commitment to the right solution, but every child naturally adopts it, because reality forces upon everybody the realisation of the limits of one’s power as well as the risk of ongoing rivalry and conflict. Furthermore, sheer fatigue from conflict and war may lead to that change of attitude that is associated with compromise in the first stage and toleration in the second. This was the historical case in the aftermath of the bloodshed of the wars of religion in the early modern period, but can also explain the development of the capacity to tolerate in children.

Toleration is, however, trickier than compromise, since it requires the development of a sense of an independent value – that of respect for others. Education to toleration consists in the formation of a capacity to see beliefs and actions not in the light of some impersonally validating criteria but as parts in a coherent whole, constituting a moral personality or character and being the consequence of a sincere attempt to achieve meaning and truth. It takes moral imagination, the ability to see the other from her point of view. And unlike the development of the sense of justice, or the realisation of the inevitability of compromise, which are universal and independent of any specific moral view, toleration is a ‘local’, culture-dependent value, which can be given meaning only within a liberal morality. There is nothing in the nature of society or human nature as such which makes toleration necessary.

It should be noted that less restrictive analyses of toleration, such as Peter Gardner’s, view it as an attitude that does not necessarily involve dislike or disapproval by the tolerator. Toleration, according to these accounts, means more openness, less certainty about one’s beliefs, the willingness to deliberate and change one’s opinions. People can be tolerant towards practices and beliefs that they themselves neither disapprove of nor dislike, but that
others would be likely to disapprove of or dislike.\textsuperscript{13} Consequently, education to toleration requires the development of open-mindedness, critical scepticism, the power of deliberation, and the willingness to change one’s attitude. This concept of toleration eschews the difficulty of the more restrictive concept, according to which toleration means the commitment to a particular opinion that excludes the tolerated one. Education to toleration, in this case, does not imply supporting children’s biases and prejudices.\textsuperscript{14}

Gardner’s conception of toleration definitely accords with everyday usage of the term. However, it does not capture the most difficult and demanding contexts in which toleration is called for (and considered as intrinsically valuable). It tends to blur the boundaries between tolerance, on the one hand, and open-mindedness, critical scepticism and moderate judgement, on the other. It does not do justice to the suffering of the tolerator, the price of restraint and the effort involved in it. And although it considers tolerance and respect as compatible, it does not distinguish between the tolerance and respect shown to the person and the disapproval and lack of respect for the belief or practice as such.

In 1998, the Israeli Ministry of Education officially declared the school year as that of ‘the right to self-respect and the duty to respect’. The aim was surely political, and the basic idea was to ease the social and ideological tensions following the trauma of Rabin’s assassination. But I believe that there was something philosophically correct in the juxtaposition of the right to self-respect (or to be respected) and the duty to respect others. Ultimately, the source of our awareness of the intrinsic value of other people’s lives and personalities grows out of our sense of the infinite (immeasurable) value of our life to ourselves! This is not only in line with the Kantian heritage in ethical theory but also the basic clue as to the educational means for promoting a tolerant perception of moral differences. Even if I am convinced that you are morally wrong in the way you are leading your life, I can perceive the independent value of your personality analogically to the intrinsic value that I ascribe to my own life. For I basically value my own life and autonomy irrespective of the particular views I hold or even the actions that I take.

A similar projection of self-centred values to the way we view others occurs in the education to autonomous choice. The separation of the personal from the impersonal is manifest in teaching the young that the way in which beliefs and values are adopted is of no less importance than their truth or validity. The educator’s intellectual effort in the inculcation of critical thinking and autonomous choice often constitutes a conscious tempering of the pursuit of truth as such. Children and adults are called to experiment with ideas even at the risk of error, since the experiment itself is regarded as having an intrinsic value. Now, it is relatively easy for the subject herself to recognise the value of such authenticity, free choice, or critical reflection. But symmetrical thinking leads to the ascription of the
same value to others. This is one of the main routes to toleration: patience with other people’s mistakes, the moderation of the judgemental attitude, or the capacity ‘to deliberate with equanimity’.15

And yet the transition from the duty to respect others to the ideal of toleration is neither necessary nor morally neutral. Non-liberals can consistently adopt the norm of respect and at the same time interpret it as fully consistent with or even requiring of an intolerant interference in the lives of those who happen to be wrong in their beliefs and values. Sincere paternalistic concern for the welfare of heretics motivates many forms of religious intolerance. Only in the liberal understanding of respect does a principled restraint, toleration, follow from the principle of respect. This is a notion of respect that is constituted by the ultimate value of the subject’s free choice and the relevance of the manner in which the beliefs are formed in the subject. Therefore, education to toleration is possible, but only within a general liberal framework. And even within that framework it is far from easy, since it involves a schizophrenic, two-level view of the nature of moral judgement, and the versatile capacity to switch from the one to the other and to do so in the right circumstances.

Our philosophical analysis of the concept of toleration has demonstrated that the concept is elusive. The pure concept turns out to have little concrete application, since the space between what should not be opposed to begin with and what should not be tolerated is very narrow. Thus, we learn that in most uses of the concept of toleration what we really mean is either compromise, or recognition of plurality, or even indifference. The notion of tolerance is not only conceptually evasive; it is historically and psychologically intermediary in nature, merely a stage between intolerant opposition and positive recognition. This conclusion is of a significant educational import, since as a matter of fact we are justified in hoping that by the promotion of the capacity to compromise, which we showed to be an easier task, we gradually learn to tolerate others; and that by acquiring a tolerant disposition, we progressively move towards full recognition of at least some of the opinions and practices of other people. Thus, through the general capacity to separate subjects from their actions, human beings can learn first to compromise, then to tolerate, and finally to fully respect and accept other individuals.16

Notes
2 See Rainer Forst’s contribution to this volume.
3 This particular case can also serve to illustrate a very interesting model of convergence of two different modes of concession: the liberal secular sector shows tolerance (in the principled sense) towards the orthodox, while the orthodox –
lacking a principled value of tolerance – are willing to ‘tolerate’ the secular for their own theological reasons (such as the common ancestry and Jewish identity). This convergence is obviously contingent and hence not very stable, but it may prove to be of much pragmatic social and political value.

4 For a sophisticated justification of toleration in utilitarian terms, see D. Lewis, ‘Mill and Milquetoast’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1989) 152–71. Lewis rejects Mill's account of toleration in terms of its overall utility from an impersonal (neutral) point of view, but he believes that the parties to a conflict may be led to tolerate each other by considerations of the personal risks and benefits involved in pursuing intolerant behaviour. Lewis's approach might be relevant to education, but his concept of toleration is closer to that of pragmatic compromise than to a principled notion of toleration along Mill's line.


6 M. Lorberbaum has convincingly shown that respect for the integrity of another individual does not necessarily mean the recognition of autonomy as a fundamental value. In the Jewish tradition the idea of tolerance is associated with the willingness to accept certain kinds of errors in moral judgement, those that have ‘grounds’. Lorberbaum’s analysis leaves room for a ‘non-liberal’ concept of toleration, which even if deviating from the strict sense that we are (somewhat artificially) ascribing to the concept in this chapter, is both widespread and of educational significance: M. Lorberbaum, ‘Learning from mistakes: resources of tolerance in the Jewish tradition’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 29 (1995) 273–84.


9 Contemporary educational conceptions of tolerance often emphasise the ability to put up with difference. But it should be noted that tolerance requires more than the sheer civilised management of public disputes. It involves both the ability to listen seriously to the other (taking her point of view) during the discussion and tolerance of the remaining disagreements at the end of the discussion. See V. Waksman, ‘What we talk about when we talk about tolerance’, Thinking, 13 (1998) 46–9.


12 R. H. Dees, ‘Trust and the rationality of toleration’, Nous, 32 (1998) 82–98. Dees correctly points out that toleration requires more than a ‘conversion’, and that for its long-term maintenance toleration must be thought of as a value and not just a compromise. Tolerance can be achieved only on the basis of trust, which is a fragile achievement.

a character trait (which does not imply disapproval), the latter being a judgmental conclusion (which presupposes disapproval).

14 Ibid., p. 98.


16 For a similar conclusion, though not based on the same analysis of toleration, see G. Haydon, *Teaching About Values* (London: Cassell, 1997), pp. 56–9, pp. 127–9. Haydon argues that only on the basis of a pragmatic approach to toleration can we hope to show that toleration is not another, sectarian (liberal) value and educate non-liberals too on the ideal of mutual restraint.