

Another look at definites in existentials

YAEL ZIV

Department of English, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

(Received 10 December 1979)

1. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

Existential sentences have usually been defined on the basis of their morpho-syntactic characteristics. In English, the term has been used to designate those sentences in which the unstressed, non-dedictic *there* occurs. It has been further observed that most such sentences contain the verb *be*, an indefinite NP and a locative adverbial following *there* in that order. Despite this syntactic characterization, however, the term 'existential sentence' has been taken, erroneously, to refer to some semantic features of the sentence as well, and so it has been generally assumed that existential sentences always assert the existence of some entity.¹

Various cross linguistic similarities have been observed to hold of existential sentences (cf. Clark, 1970; Kuno, 1973; *inter alia*), in particular the restriction on the occurrence of definite NP's has been taken to be a basic characteristic of existential sentences across languages.² The most commonly cited explanation for this distributional restriction is the absurdity of the assertion of existence of an entity that is already presupposed to exist (by virtue of its semantic definiteness) (cf. Kuno, 1971).³ Instances where definite NP's were found to occur in an apparently existential sentence have usually been reduced to semantic indefiniteness (i.e. relativized and modified NP's, certain superlatives cf. Perlmutter, 1970; Kuno, 1973; Fauconnier, 1973; Bolinger, 1977; Rando & Napoli, 1978).

Recently (Milsark, 1974; Rando & Napoli, 1978) a whole class of *there* sentences with potentially definite NP's has been observed, and the claim has been advanced that these are just *there*-sentences which constitute a special subset of existential sentences allowing definite NP's since the assertion of

[1] I wish to thank A. Mittwoch, R. Berman, D. Bolinger, A. Ziv and an anonymous reader for *Journal of Linguistics* for their comments and suggestions.

[2] By definite NP's is meant not just nouns occurring with the definite determiner, of course, but also personal pronouns, proper nouns, demonstratives, and possessives (cf. Bolinger, 1977: 119 for a discussion of a scale of definiteness in reference to existential sentences).

[3] Another type of explanation is provided in Milsark (1974, 1977) where definite determiners are taken to be instances of universal quantification. Existential sentences are thus claimed to exclude definite NP's due to the potential double quantification of the sets denoted by the NP's (universally quantified by virtue of occurring with the definite determiner and existentially quantified by virtue of their occurrence in an existential sentence).

existence is made of the list (which is conceived of as indefinite) and not of the entities (definite or indefinite) comprising it. In other words, the list and not its components constitutes the argument in list-*there* sentences and hence a definite NP which is but a member of the list is not an argument of the existential predicate and its definiteness is fully compatible with the restriction on the distribution of definites in existential sentences.

In this paper I will discuss an apparently existential construction in Colloquial Modern Hebrew (CMH) where the non-locative NP is definite. It will be shown that there are at least two different constructions that converge on a similar existential syntactic structure and that for only one of them could the 'list interpretation' be offered to explain away the definiteness.

I shall discuss two types of explanations for the apparent distributional oddity in the second construction. The first concentrates on the nature of the problematic definite NP in question, in an attempt to show that it is in fact indefinite either semantically or both syntactically and semantically. This attempt at saving the generalization about the non-occurrence of definites in existential sentences is in line with the general treatment of such apparent exceptions (cf. Kuno, 1973; Rando & Napoli, 1978).

The second type of explanation involves a discussion of the nature of the relevant construction, in an attempt to show that the term 'existential sentence' is a misnomer on semantic and communicative functional grounds. The restriction on the occurrence of definites may, thus, simply apply to only a subset of the set of sentences originally conceived of as 'existential' and the occurrence of definite NPs in the sentences under consideration might turn out to be non-problematic since these sentences would not belong to the relevant set of existentials to which the restriction is applicable.

2. A DESCRIPTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION IN QUESTION

2.1. General comments

The pattern that is under investigation can be represented as:

yeš	et	definite NP	locative element (= prepositional phrase or adverbial marker)
existential particle 'be'	definite accusative marker		pronoun)

The occurrence of the existential particle initially is one of the major characteristics of this construction as an existential sentence.⁴ As stated

in the introduction there are at least two different constructions converging on this type of pattern: the two differ as to the nature of, and co-occurrence constraints between, the non-locative and the locative elements in them. I will discuss both constructions in some detail so that the differences between them will be clear and the necessity for a 'non-list explanation' for the occurrence of definite NPs in the second of these constructions will be evident.

2.2. The 'list reading' construction

Consider the following sentences:

(1)	yeš	šam	et	xomski	(et	ros	ve'od
	exis.	there		def.	Chomsky (def.	acc.	Ross and more
	part.	(loc.		acc.	pron.)	m.	
	'be'	pron.)		m.			

kama bašanim mefursamin)
several linguists famous)

literally: 'There is/are Chomsky (Ross and some other famous linguists) there.'

(2) (a)	yeš	šam	et	xomski	(same gloss as in (1))
---------	-----	-----	----	--------	---------------------------

(b)	yeš	et	xomski	be	am	ay	it
-----	-----	----	--------	----	----	----	----

lit : 'There is Chomsky at M.I.T.'

(3) (a)	yeš	et	moše	dayan	banemsala	hazot
	exis.	def.	Moshe	Dayan	in the	the
	part.	acc.m.			government	this

lit : 'There is Moshe Dayan in this government.'

(3) (b)	yeš	šam	/	ba	et	moše	dayan
	exis.	there		in her	def.	Moshe	Dayan
	part.	(loc.		(= in	acc.m.		
		pron.)		it)			

(4)	yeš	ba'aron	haze /	šam	et	hame'il
	exis.	in the	the	there	def.	the coat
	particle	closet	this	(loc. pron)	acc.m.	
	haxadaš	šelxa				
	the new	your				

lit : 'There is in this closet/there your new coat.'

In the sentences of (1)-(4) the non-locative, definite NP's or proper nouns constitute the non-contrastive intonation nucleus (irrespective of their location in the sentence). As is generally the case in existential sentences the

[4] The particle *yeš* is restricted in its occurrence to existentials and possessives when occurring sentence-initially in the unmarked case. It may occur in certain locatives following the subject and showing agreement with it (cf. Berman & Grosu, 1976; Clark, 1979). With respect to the construction under investigation, we will not be concerned with its origin here, but see Ziv (1976) for a discussion of definite NP's in certain possessive constructions.

locative element functions as the theme and the non-locative element as the theme, the predications in (1)-(4) are of the institute (M.I.T.) (1-2), this government (3) and this closet (4) and not of Chomsky, Dayan and your coat respectively. This is evident from the context in which such sentences can occur: Sentences (1), (2a) and (2b) can all serve as appropriate responses to:

(5) Who is teaching linguistics at M.I.T. this year?
but not to

(6) Where is Chomsky this year?

hence:

(2) (b)* yeš oto/et xomski be am ay ti
him

likewise (3a) and (3b) are appropriate as continuations of

(7) Don't put down the present government in Israel

but not as responses to a query about Dayan as in

(8) What do you know about Moshe Dayan?

hence:

(3) (a)* yeš oto/et moše dayan bameššala hanoxeti
him in the government the present
(acc.)

and also (4) is appropriate in a context where the content of the brown closet is at issue

(9) What's in the brown closet?

and not in a context where the coat is being asked about as in

(10) Do you know where my coat is?

hence:

(4)* yeš oto baaron hašum
him in the the brown
et ha-ne'il šelxa in the closet

[5] The terms 'theme' and 'rheme' are used here in the sense of the Prague School (Grammarians (cf. Firbas, 1971). Their most important characteristics in the present context are (a) that the theme constitutes the predication (to the extent that the term 'predication' is appropriate with respect to existentials) and the rheme - what the predication is of, and (b) that this distribution

The potential anaphoricity of the locative expression in (1)-(4) may serve as additional evidence for its thematic status: in general non-contrastive anaphoric expressions tend to constitute part of the theme and not to occur in the rheme.

It is worth noting that the claim made in these sentences is not in fact an assertion of existence of entities which were previously not presupposed to exist, but rather a reminder of the presence of the people/objects in question in a given location, or even the establishment of a relation between the location and the person/thing present in it (cf. Bolinger, 1977, and Ziv, forthcoming).

The solution to the occurrence of definite NPs in list-*there* sentences in English (Milsark, 1974; Rando & Napoli, 1978) might be relevant in the present case as well. The above statement does not necessarily imply that I consider the 'list solution' fully worked out, but it seems to me that in light of example sentences such as (1), where the list is explicit, and the similarity in the general characteristics (intonation, appropriateness in context) that the sentences in (1)-(4) and the list-*there* sentences (as discussed in Rando & Napoli, 1978) show, it is logical to assume that in essence the two would be explained in the same way whatever the final explanation turns out to be.

The main concern of this paper, however, is a similar yet distinct construction, for which the existing explanations for the definiteness are either irrelevant (e.g. list) or unsatisfactory (as will become evident shortly).

2.3. The second construction (*non-list*)

Consider the following sentences:

1) yeš et hašefer haze baširiya hale'unit
exist. def. the book this in the library
particle acc.m.

oto hašefer baširiya hale'unit
him(=it) the department

vebesifriyat hamaxlaka
and in the library (of) the department

lit.: 'There is this book/Chomsky's book/it in the National Library and in the departmental library.'

of information in the sentence correlates highly with the intonation pattern, such that the rheme, but not the theme, contains the intonation nucleus. Mention has to be made, though, of contrastive stress, which not only violates the assignment of unmarked intonation, but also indicates an irregular 'theme' 'rheme' distribution (cf. Erteschik-Shir and Lappin, ms., and Taglicht, ms.).

Transl.: 'The National Library and the departmental library have this/Chomsky's book' it

(12) *yeš* exist. *et* def. *hame'lim* the coats *šei* of *dior* Dior *bekol* in every store *xanut* store/You can find Dior coats in any (old) store.⁶

and

(13) *yeš* exist. *et* def. *hamexonit* the car *hazot* the *ecel* at *kol* every *soxen* dealer

ba'arec in the country

'This car' can be found at any/every dealers' in the country.'

The nature of the definite non-locative NP is hard to characterize, but for the present purposes it is enough to note that the NP in question cannot be interpreted as referring to a unique, specific entity, but rather to a more general entity, not the type, perhaps, but probably some non-specific subset of tokens of the type of the relevant entity.

This is evident from a consideration of (a) sentences like

(11) *yeš et basefer haze basifriya hale'unit bešioša otakim*

'There is this book in the National Library in three copies.'

'They (impersonal) have three copies of this book in the National Library' (So you do not need to buy a copy of your own).

where it is impossible on logical grounds to assume that either one unique copy of the book or its type are referred to; (b) the ill formedness of sentences like (14), which is a characteristic locative construction, where a unique and specific book as the referent cannot co-occur with the phrase 'bešioša otakim' (lit.: 'in three copies' meaning: 'there are three copies of it')

(14)* *hu /* *basefer* *haze basifriya hale'unit*
he(=it) *this book*

*bešioša otakim.*⁶

[6] Note that once the verbs *ninca* ('is found', 'is located') or *yešno* (conjugated form of the existential particle) occur in a sentence like (14) its acceptability is improved considerably. A discussion of the various types of locative/existential statements is beyond the scope of this paper, but cf. Berman (1978) for some discussion.

and (c) the nature of the locative expression in (11), (12), and (13), in (11) two distinct locations are mentioned, in (12) and (13) all the relevant locations are cited. It is self evident that no unique entity can be simultaneously in two or more different places.

The contexts in which sentences such as (11)-(13) can felicitously be uttered differ significantly from the kinds of contexts that were observed to be appropriate for (1)-(4). As will become evident from an examination of these contexts, the distribution of information in the sentences (11)-(13) is such that, unlike the large majority of existential sentences, the non-locative, definite NP is the thematic element (the element of which the predication of location is made) whereas the locative element constitutes the rheme (here, the predication of location).

Witness the following contexts:

(15) Where can I/one find/get Chomsky's book (=the book that Chomsky wrote)?

(15), which is a request for information about the location where any of the set of tokens of the book may be obtained, may be answered felicitously by (11), but (16), which is usually interpreted as a question about the location of a specific, unique book, cannot. Hence:

(16) Where is {Chomsky's book (=Chomsky wrote, Chomsky? owns)?
my book
the book that I just bought}

(11)*

The sentence is ill formed even if one location only is cited

(11')* *yeš oto al hašukhan*
there is it on the table

Only characteristically locative sentences can serve as appropriate responses

to (16),

(17) *hu* *yešno /* *ninca /* *Ø* *basifriya /* *al* *hašukhan*
he(=it) *exist.* *is* *located/* *in the* *on* *the table*
be *found* *library*
conjugated

'It is in the library/on the table.'

The same is true in the case of (12) and (13). Sentence (13), to take another example, can comfortably occur in a context like

(18) I wanted to order a VW from Europe - What for? (13) yeš
exist. part.

et hamexonit hazot ecei kol soxen ba'arec
def. the car the at every dealer in the country
acc. this m.

Transl.: 'You can get this car/This car is available at every dealers' in the country.'

Here the reference is clearly to a non-unique, non-specific token of the VW. Sentence (19), where the reference is clearly to a unique and specific car, cannot be answered felicitously by a sentence like (13) (even if only one location is cited)

(19) I didn't see your car.

(13)* naxon, yeš ota bagaraj

true, exist. her(=it) in the garage
correct part.

'True, there is it in the garage.' ('It is in the garage.')

Only a clearly locative sentence can serve as an appropriate response in this context.

(20) naxon, hi yešna / nimec / o bagaraj

true she(=it) exist. is found in the garage
part. located conjugated

'True, it is in the garage'

Having sketched the main characteristics of the relevant construction, we can now proceed to seek an explanation for the occurrence of the definite NP in it, counter to the universal generalization concerning existential sentences.

3. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS

There are two basic alternative explanations for the occurrence of definites in the relevant existential sentences: the first is that the definiteness is only a surface syntactic property, and that in fact the NPs in question are either semantically or both syntactically (in underlying form) and semantically indefinite, and the second is that the structure under investigation is not an existential sentence in the sense which is relevant for the restriction on the occurrence of definites. The two alternatives will be discussed here in some detail. Before we engage in this discussion, however, it is important to reiterate

the position that the 'first-reading solution', whatever it ultimately turns out to be, is irrelevant to the construction in question (the second construction) and so a different explanation is required.

3.1. Semantic indefiniteness

Explaining the apparent violation of the restriction on definiteness in existential sentences in terms of semantic indefiniteness (the type of explanation offered in Kuno, 1973, *inter alia*) presupposes a relatively well-defined notion of semantic definiteness. Unfortunately, however, there is no such clear-cut, non-controversial notion, and this, of course, is a major drawback of this whole endeavour.

Rando and Napoli (1978) offer anaphora as the criterion of semantic definiteness in terms of which the restriction on existentials should be stated, namely, no anaphoric NP can occur in existentials. If this criterion is adopted, then the sentences under investigation (11)-(13), particularly the version in which the NP in question is realized as an anaphoric pronoun, stand in clear violation of the restriction. Witness the following exchange:

(21) Where can I/one find Dior coats in this country?

(22) yeš otam bekol xanut gdola
them exist. (anaphoric in every store big
part. pron. (acc.))

Transl.: 'They have them in every big department store.'

A further problem with this approach concerns anaphora as a criterion. The status of the NP in question with respect to anaphora is not very clear. Rando and Napoli suggest that for the restriction on existentials to hold the anaphoric NP should be 'the proper unique referent.' They claim that generics properly refer to the unique class (and hence can not occur in existentials), but that non-specific/non-generics are non-anaphoric.

The application of the finer criterion of 'proper unique referent' to the NPs in question indicates that there are still some problems that need to be accounted for, but that a sufficiently detailed and modified version of this criterion could perhaps be observationally adequate in accounting for the distribution of the relevant NPs in existential sentences. Thus, an exchange like the following

(15') Where can I get Chomsky's *Aspects*?

(11) (a) yeš oto bekol hasifriyot ha'ironiyot
exist. him in all the libraries the municipal
part. (=it)

Not only is the exact nature of the abstract NP unclear, but there are additional problems of pronominalization and there is, of course, the problem of lack of independent syntactic motivation for, or reflex of, this abstract representation. (See also Nunberg (1978), where an abstract syntax approach to the representation of various meanings of polyssemous items is described as being workable but unrevealing.)

Such problems abound within the abstract syntax attempt at explaining away the apparent violation of the restriction on existentials. These are not insurmountable problems technically; with the help of the appropriate mechanism such solutions are clearly workable, but they are hardly revealing.

3.3 The existential status of the relevant construction

The alternatives presented in 3.1 and 3.2 to explain the occurrence of the definite NP in what appears like an existential construction are based on the assumption that this is indeed an existential sentence. The following suggestion attempts to challenge the status of the construction under investigation as an existential sentence.

The term 'existential sentence', I would like to suggest, is a misnomer. The assumption underlying the restriction on the occurrence of definite NP's in existential sentences is that every sentence showing the morphological and syntactic structure utilized by an existential sentence is in fact an existential sentence and functionally. However, I would like to claim that this is not in fact always the case and that there are sentences which bear morpho-syntactic similarities to sentences which are semantically and functionally existentials, but which are themselves not used to assert existence, but to fulfil some other communicative function. The occurrence of definite NP's in these sentences is perfectly natural, since the logical basis for the restriction on the distribution of definite NP's in existentials does not hold in such cases. In particular, I will try to show that the sentences under investigation share communicative functional characteristics with locative sentences and that once communicative function is taken into consideration these sentences constitute no violation of the restriction on existentials.

An examination of the sentences of (11)-(13) from the point of view of the kinds of contexts in which they can occur and their thematic-rhematic distribution is quite revealing. As noted in 2.3, the most natural context for sentences such as (11)-(13) is one where information about the location of some entity/entities is required, or where the speaker wishes to make a locative statement, so to speak. Thus in (15) (repeated here for convenience) the question is clearly about a location (namely, an appropriate informative answer would specify the location).

(15) Where can I/one find/get Chomsky's book?
and sentence (11)

(11) yeš oto basifriya hale'umit vebesifriyat hamaxlakka
exist. him in the the National and in the the
part. (=it) library library (of) department
counts as a felicitous reply specifying the location where the book could be obtained.

A similar context would be natural for sentences (12) and (13). Sentence (12) could be an appropriate response to a query about where one can buy classy coats, and as the exchange (18) and (13) (repeated here) indicates

(18) - I wanted to order a VW from Europe.

- What for?

(13) yeš et hamexonit hazot ecel kol soxen ba'arec
exist. def. the car the this at every dealer in the
part. accm. country

(13) is used, felicitously, to convey information about location, which is, apparently, not known to the addressee.

A consideration of the thematic-rhematic distribution in such sentences reveals that unlike the ordinary variety of existentials, the location constitutes the rheme and the non-locative NP (the one that is realized by a pronoun, a proper noun or a definite NP in our sentences) serves as the thematic element. All known instances of existentials are claimed to have the locative element as the theme and the non-locative NP as the rheme (here, the point of the assertion).

The potential realization of the NP in question as an anaphoric pronoun serves as additional evidence for this peculiar thematic-rhematic distribution of information in sentences such as (11)-(13).

Anaphoric pronouns most naturally occur in the thematic part of the sentence, in fact, unless heavily stressed (in which case they probably function as contrastive elements, with the tendency to constitute new information), an anaphoric pronoun cannot, by definition, occur in the rhematic part of the sentence.

The rhematic nature of the locative element in the constructions under investigation, as well as the kinds of contexts in which these constructions can felicitously occur, establish a functional affinity between our special existential constructions and purely locative sentences. Both make locative statements, differing in fact mainly in the nature of the NP of which the location is predicated, such that the construction under investigation predicates location of a presumably non-specific subset of tokens of the type of some entity,

whereas a purely locative sentence usually makes a locative predication of a specific entity. Sentences (14)–(17) (in Section 2.3) indicate this rather clearly.⁸

For the restriction on the distribution of definite NP's in existential sentences (whatever the ultimate formulation) to be non-arbitrary, the communicative function of existentials needs to be taken into account. The implicit assumption that all structurally similar sentences share the semantic and functional characteristics of existentials, turns out to be unmotivated. The sentences under investigation have been shown to share crucial functional characteristics with locative rather than existential statements. These functional characteristics are at the heart of the restriction on existentials. It follows that the occurrence of the definite NP in the relevant construction constitutes no violation of the semantically-logically motivated restriction on the distribution of definites in existentials and hence is perfectly natural and requires no further explanation.

4. SPECULATIONS AND POSSIBLE EXTENSION

4.1. *Speculations and potential implications*

On the basis of the present research, I have come to suspect that other varieties of so-called 'existential sentences' could be shown not to be used to make assertions of existence, and that apparent peculiarities in distribution in some of these so-called 'existentials' are, presumably, due to the different communicative function for which these sentences are designed.

It follows that the term 'existentials' as currently used in the linguistic literature is a misnomer; it is semantically and functionally misleading and it would be best to replace it with a functionally-semantically neutral term, if certain formal generalizations are to be preserved. The term 'existential' then is to be reserved for only that subset of what is known today as 'existential' for which it makes semantic and functional sense.

4.2. *Topics for further research*

An obvious topic for further research is the question whether 'non-list existentials' with definites occur in other languages and if so, what properties are associated with them. The following English sentences (suggested by an anonymous reader for *Journal of Linguistics*) may count as likely candidates:

- (26) (a) A: Where can I get cloth like this?
B: There's that cloth exactly on the first floor in Harrods.

[8] In Ziv (forthcoming) the construction in question is shown to manifest on the one hand a strong formal affinity with existential sentences (the existential particle occurs sentence-initially in both (cf. fn. 4)), and on the other hand both a minor structural affinity (in the relative position of the locative element and the non-locative NP) and a major functional affinity (in the nature of the predication) with locative sentences.

ANOTHER LOOK AT DEFINITES IN EXISTENTIALS

- (b) A: Where did you get that painting?
B: There's either it or its twin brother in the Rembrandthuis in Holland.

- (c) When you go to France, there's Brigitte Bardot or Simone Signoret behind the counter in every tabac.

- (d) I don't think what you just said is original. There's exactly that argument/exactly the same argument on the first page of *Syntactic structures*.

It should be noted, however, that NP's preceded by definite or demonstrative determiners can hardly occur in such constructions unmodified; hence the illformedness of the following:

- (26) (a) A: Where can I get cloth like this?
B: * There's that cloth on the first floor in Harrods.
(d') I don't think what you just said is original. * There's that argument/the argument on the first page of *Syntactic structures*.

cf. Rando & Napoli (1978: 305–306) for more examples and some discussion.

Likewise, the native informants whom I consulted found the use of a pronoun in such sentences (cf. 26b) quite impossible. Bolinger (personal communication) raised the possibility that this might be a rather superficial restriction on the pronoun system in English, in view of examples such as:

- (27) If you want a copy of Chomsky's book,
(a) you'll find it in the university bookstore,
(b) you'll find one in the university bookstore.
(c)* there's it in the university bookstore.
(d) there's one in the university bookstore.

A full examination of the English data, however, is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.

REFERENCES

- Berman-Aronson, R. (1978). *Modern Hebrew structure*. Tel-Aviv: University Publishing Projects.
Berman (Aronson), R. & Grosu, A. (1976). Aspects of the copula in Modern Hebrew. In Cole, P. (ed.), *Studies in Modern Hebrew syntax and semantics*. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company. 265–285.
Bolinger, D. (1977). *Meaning and form*. London: Longman.
Clark, E. V. (1970). Locationalis: a study of the relations between 'existential', 'locative' and 'possessive' constructions. In *Working papers in language universals*. Stanford University.
Fauconnier, G. (1975). Pragmatic scales and logical structure. *LIn* 6, 353–376.
Green, G. M. (1974). *Semantics and syntactic regularity*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Kuno, S. (1971). The position of locatives in existential sentences. *LIn* 2, 333–378.
Kuno, S. (1973). *The Structure of the Japanese language*. Cambridge, Ma: M.I.T. Press.
Langendoen, D. T. (1966). The syntax of the English expletive 'it'. In *Georgetown monographs on languages and linguistics* 19. Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University.

YABEL ZIV

- McCawley, J. D. (1968). Lexical insertion in a transformational grammar without deep structure. In *Papers from the fourth regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society*. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. 71-80.
- Milsark, G. L. (1974). *Existential sentences in English*. M.I.T. Dissertation.
- Milsark, G. L. (1977). Toward an explanation of certain peculiarities of the existential construction in English. *Linguistic Analysis* 3. 1-30.
- Nunberg, G. D. (1978). *The pragmatics of reference*. University of California, Berkeley. Dissertation.
- Perlmutter, D. (1970). On the article in English. In Bierwisch, M. and Heidolph, K. E. (eds.) *Progress in linguistics*. The Hague: Mouton. 233-248.
- Postal, P. M. (1969). Anaphoric islands. In *Papers from the fifth regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society*. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. 203-239.
- Rando, E. & Napoli, D. J. (1978). Definites in 'there' sentences. *Lg* 54:2. 300-313.
- Taglicht, J. (forthcoming). Intonation and contrast. To appear in *JL*.
- Ziv, Y. (1976). On the reanalysis of grammatical terms in Hebrew possessive constructions. In Cole, P. (ed.), *Studies in Modern Hebrew syntax and semantics*. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company. 129-152.
- Ziv, Y. (forthcoming). On the existential - locative - possessive continuum.