Research by Topic (by date below)

Papers

1. Hart, E., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2nd round review). Getting to Less: When negotiating harms post-agreement performance. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
The negotiation process can harm a counterpart’s motivation to fulfill the contract. In contrast to prior work that has assumed that negotiated agreements represent the full economic value of negotiated outcomes, we demonstrate that the act of engaging in a negotiation can itself influence post-agreement behavior in ways that change the economic value of an agreement. Across six studies, we demonstrate that negotiations can harm post-agreement motivation and productivity on both effortful and creative tasks. Specifically, we find that wage negotiations can harm post-agreement performance, even when the negotiation has integrative potential or is conducted face-to-face. Negotiations can increase perceptions of relational conflict, and these conflict perceptions mediate the relationship between negotiation and motivation. Compared to not negotiating, individuals who negotiate may secure favorable deal terms, but risk incurring affective, relational, and economic costs after the agreement. Our investigation fills a critical gap in our understanding of how negotiations influence subsequent performance, and has particular relevance for negotiations that involve the provision of services. Our findings suggest that individuals should enter negotiations with caution, and we call for future work to explore post negotiation behavior in service contexts.  Paper   -top-
2. Hart, E., Mellers, B.A., & Bicchieri, C. (2nd round review). Bad luck or bad intentions: When do third party observers reveal offender’s intentions to victims? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.
Intentional harm is often a catalyst to action for victims and third party observers. Yet, harm may also be unintended. If there is a third party observer, and the victim does not know whether harm was intentional or accidental, would that observer reveal the offender’s intentions to the victim? In five studies, we investigated when and why third party observers reveal offenders’ intentions. We used an economic game in which participants observed a player being monetarily harmed either accidentally or intentionally. Third party observers were more likely to inform the victims when harm was accidental than intentional. We distinguish between two types of motives. First, emotional motives are desires to express one’s moral anger and empathy. Second, instrumental motives reflect desires to correct the victim’s impressions and ensure future fairness. Third party behavior is motivated by moral emotions of anger and empathy. Anger toward the offenders increases the likelihood that the observer will inform the victim when harm is intentional. Empathy for the victim increases the likelihood of informing the victim about intentional and accidental harm. Moreover, third party behavior is motivated by instrumental motives that reflect fairness concerns. By correcting the victim’s impression of the offender, the observer is ensuring fair future interactions between victim and offender. We discuss implications for forgiveness and management of conflict.   -top-
3. Shen, Q., Teo, M., Winter, E., Hart, E., Chew, S. H., & Ebstein, R. P. (2016). To Cheat or Not To Cheat: Tryptophan Hydroxylase 2 SNP Variants Contribute to Dishonest Behavior. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 10, 82.‏
Although lying (bearing false witness) is explicitly prohibited in the Decalogue and a focus of interest in philosophy and theology, more recently the behavioral and neural mechanisms of deception are gaining increasing attention from diverse fields especially economics, psychology, and neuroscience. Despite the considerable role of heredity in explaining individual differences in deceptive behavior, few studies have investigated which specific genes contribute to the heterogeneity of lying behavior across individuals. Also, little is known concerning which specific neurotransmitter pathways underlie deception. Toward addressing these two key questions, we implemented a neurogenetic strategy and modeled deception by an incentivized die-under-cup task in a laboratory setting. The results of this exploratory study provide provisional evidence that SNP variants across the tryptophan hydroxylase 2 (TPH2) gene, that encodes the rate-limiting enzyme in the biosynthesis of brain serotonin, contribute to individual differences in deceptive behavior.  Paper   -top-
4. Hart, E., Avrahami, J., & Kareev, Y. (2016). Enlarging the market yet decreasing the profit: Competitive behavior when investment affects the prize. Judgment and Decision Making, 11(4), 380-390.
In many competitive situations, our investments increase our gains: Developing better products or research proposals may lead to higher contracts or patents or larger grants. Does increasing investment in such cases always guarantee higher gains? We used an experimental repeated competition game in which prizes depended on contestants’ investments (n=108). Contestants invested more when they increased the potential prize (“enlarge the market”), yet in some cases this tendency was counterproductive (“decrease the profit”): Contestants in fact diminished their earnings, compared to sitting out the competition and keeping their initial funds. Moreover, when a contestant’s investment decreased an opponent’s prize, the contestant tended to invest less; this effect, in turn, led to higher overall gains for both contestants. This result implies that prosocial considerations are at play. Notably, in certain situations, excessive competitive tendencies may lead to a larger waste of resources.  Paper   -top-
5. Hart, E., Avrahami, J., Kareev, Y., & Todd, P. M. (2015). Investing Even in Uneven Contests: Effects of Asymmetry on Investment in Contests. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 28(4), 395–409.
Many competitions, such as political campaigns, innovative endeavors, sports or courting rituals, require investment of non-refundable resources: One contestant wins the prize for the invested amount, while all others lose their investments without receiving compensation. Frequently, contests are asymmetric, due to differing resources or prize valuations. Does asymmetry discourage the weaker players from investing? Do stronger players take this into account, and also invest less? Or does the desire to win abolish these differences? Two experiments explored the effects of asymmetry between the contestants – arising from their resources or prizes – on non-refundable investments. Subjects repeatedly competed in both symmetric and asymmetric contests, enabling within-subject comparisons. We observed an effect of asymmetry only when it concerned resources: Subjects overall invested less when their resources were unequal, whereas inequality in the prizes did not influence investments; this pattern suggests that winning itself is motivating. The changes between consecutive investments can be explained by reactions to the previous outcome (win or loss): Across all contests, investment decreased following a win, and increased following a loss.  Paper   -top-
6. Hart, E., Kareev, Y., & Avrahami, J. (2015). Good Times, Bad Times: Reversal of Risky Choice in a Good versus a Bad World. Decision, 3(2), 132-145.
In many situations one has to choose between risky alternatives, based only on one's past experience with these alternatives. Such decisions can be made in more – or less – benevolent states of the world. Predictions concerning two crucial aspects of choice behavior – the overall probability of choosing the riskier alternative and the round-to-round choice dynamics – depend on how one evaluates one’s payoff: Whether in its own right, compared to possible outcomes within the chosen alternative (which could result in disappointment), or compared to foregone outcomes, those of other, unchosen alternatives (which could result in regret). In two experiments, subjects made repeated, incentivized choices between two gambles, one riskier than the other, neither offering a sure amount. We explored whether and how choices are affected by the state of world in which they are made. States were manipulated both between-subjects (Experiment 1, N=144) and within-subjects (Experiment 2, N=132). We observed a significant effect of state on overall choice probability: In more benevolent states, subjects tended to choose the riskier alternative, and vice versa in worse states; choice dynamics were similar across states, and were most strongly affected by reactions to the forgone payoff. These patterns of results are in line with a regret-based account.  Paper   -top-
7. Avrahami, J., Kareev, Y., & Hart, E. (2014). Taking the Sting out of Choice? Diversification of Investments. Judgment and Decision Making, 9(5), 373-386.
It is often the case that one can choose a mix of alternative options rather than have to select one option only. Such an opportunity to diversify may blunt the risk involved in all-or-none choice. Here we investigate repeated in investment decisions in two-valued options that differ in their riskiness, looking for the effects of recent decisions and their outcomes on upcoming decisions. We compare these effects to those evident in all-or-none choice between the same risky options. The ‘state of the world’, namely, the likelihood of the high versus the low outcomes of the options is manipulated. We find that aggregate allocation diverges from uniformity (i.e., from 1/n), and is sensitive to outcome probabilities with the pattern of results indicating reactivity to the outcome of the previous decision. Round-to-round dynamics reveal that the outcome of the previous decision has an effect on the subsequent decision, on top of inertia; the aspects of the outcome that influence the next decision indicate an effect of a missed opportunity, if there was one, in the previous decision. Importantly, recent outcomes have a similar effect in diversification decisions and in all-or-none choice.  Paper   -top-
8. Israel, S., Hart, E., & Winter, E. (2014). Oxytocin decreases accuracy in the perception of social deception. Psychological Science, 25, 293-295.
Social interactions such as coalition formation, negotiation and bargaining, all involve the ability to mask, and uncover, non-cooperative intentions. However, the psychobiological factors underlying the identification of deception remain poorly understood. Our study explored the role of oxytocin (OT) – a neuropeptide with marked effects on social cognition and behavior – on the ability to differentiate between authentic and falsely presented cooperative intentions within a televised social (prisoners') dilemma. We demonstrate that subjects were able to accurately differentiate between cooperators and defectors, and that this ability was negatively impacted by administration of OT. We conjecture that this impairment is characterized by less social vigilance in detecting deceptive behavior. Our findings place a cautionary note on the use of OT as a tool for decoding others' intentions, particularly in the all too common context where mixed motives may lurk behind the veil of a seemingly friendly face.  Paper   -top-

Working Papers

1. Hart, E., Campagna, R., Curhan, J., Elfenbein, H.A. (WP). Dark side of negotiation: When negotiating undermines organizational commitment.
Researchers and practitioners highly encourage job candidates to negotiate employment agreements. In our investigation, we challenge this unqualified advice to negotiate, and demonstrate that negotiation may have a detrimental impact on employees’ implementation behavior and job tenure. We collected and analyzed archival employment data of Master of Business Administration program graduates, over a period of 13 years. Individuals who negotiated their job offer left their job approximately a year earlier than individuals who did not negotiate. We then show in an experimental study with random assignment to negotiated- versus non-negotiated agreements, that the negotiation process itself influences individuals’ motivation and outcomes. Moreover, we demonstrate that negotiators report higher conflict and lower trust in their counterpart, compared to non-negotiators. This loss of relational capital mediates the detrimental impact of negotiation on post-agreement behavior. Taken together, our results suggest that negotiating affects long-term individual motivation and commitment, and impacts organizational outcomes.   -top-
2. Yu, M.*, Hart, E.*, & Gonzalez, C. (WP). Trust at a second glance: Correcting negative impressions through information seeking and perspective taking
Trust is critical for cooperation, friendship, and organizational functioning. We incorporate insights from research on decision-making and de-biasing to encourage trust development with counterparts who at first impression appear untrustworthy. We put forth interventions that increase people’s willingness to ignore unjustified negative impressions and to gather information about the counterpart's actual trustworthiness: 1) Forcing initial contact between the parties; 2) motivating parties to seek information; 3) adopting the counterpart’s perspective. Across three studies, we demonstrate the effect of the interventions on behavioral and attitudinal trust. Results show that all three interventions increased trust behavior, and corrected initial impressions that arose from untrustworthy facial appearance. Yet, the interventions' impact did not spill over to subsequent similar trust situations. We find compelling evidence that both voluntary and involuntary information acquisition can profoundly affect trust formation and dynamics. Our results underscore the importance of examining the onset of trust relationships, and the impact of decisions to acquire and use information when deciding whether to be vulnerable to one's counterpart.   -top-
3. Hart, E., VanEpps, E., & Schweitzer, M. E. (in prep) Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Unwillingness to Ask Sensitive Questions.
Gathering information is often a significant challenge, particularly when individuals have incentives to also build trust and relationships. We investigate whether and why individuals are willing to ask sensitive questions (e.g., about income, personal relationships). In our studies, we demonstrate that individuals are often reluctant to ask sensitive questions, because they fear the negative impact of their questions on the impressions they leave and on the responders' feelings. Askers overestimated their questions' influence on the Responders' impressions and feelings. Taken together, individuals may avoid asking sensitive questions to manage relationships, but in fact miss out on opportunities to gain information and build relationships.   -top-
4. Hart, E. & Schweitzer, M.E. (in prep). The Relational Concern Model: Negotiating for Services versus Products
Individuals obtain many consequential outcomes through negotiation. Negotiators aim to advance their own economic interest, but also to build trust and relationships. We challenge the implicit assumption in the negotiation literature that economic concerns and relational concerns are orthogonal. When the negotiation involves the provision of services, the negotiation process may affect relational outcomes that influence productivity. As a result, the negotiation itself may change the service and the economic value of the agreement. We show that in service negotiations, individuals need to build a collaborative relationship through the negotiation process in order to advance their economic interests. Across laboratory and field studies, we demonstrate that individuals negotiate less aggressively for services than for goods, because they fear that negotiating may harm relational outcomes. Our investigation underscores the endogenous importance of negotiators' relational outcomes to their economic outcomes, in particular when the negotiation involves services and employment.   -top-
5. Hart, E., Avrahami, J., & Kareev, Y. (WP). The strong, the weak, and lady luck: Types of uncertainty and their effects on competitive behavior.
How does uncertainty within the competition affect the behavior of unequal parties? How do strong and weak competitors behave in certain versus uncertain competitions? Does uncertainty mitigate or exacerbate the effect of inequality on behavior and outcome? In our investigation, we demonstrate that the answers to these theoretically and practically critical questions depend on the nature of uncertainty. We define two types of uncertainty: Performance uncertainty, pertaining to the relationship between competitors’ investment and the performance observed by outside judges; and Judgment uncertainty, pertaining to the translation of observed performance to winning odds. In two experiments, we investigate how Performance and Judgment uncertainty affect competitive behavior. We use repeated two-player competition games where competitors’ budgets are unequal. Performance uncertainty encourages weak and strong competitors alike; it increases the overall investment and escalates the intensity of conflict, leaving the advantage of the strong in place. In contrast, Judgment uncertainty encourages weak competitors and results in greater equality. By distinguishing between Performance uncertainty and Judgment uncertainty and demonstrating their diverging effects on competitive behavior, we reconcile seemingly conflicting findings and assumptions in the literature, underscoring the importance of conceptualizing uncertainty in a more fine-grained way.   -top-

Theses

1. Ph.D (2015). Costly Contests and the Will to Win. Advisors: Yaakov Kareev, Judith Avrahami.
Competitions are ubiquitous in plant, animal and human societies – for food, living space, mates; in schools, in the workplace, in sports, in research and development enterprises, in political races as well as in state conflicts and wars. Many resources are spent on such competitions – time, effort or money – investments which are often non-refundable. One contestant wins the prize for the invested amount, while all others lose their investments without receiving compensation. High investments may benefit society in general, for example in innovative endeavors; yet, high investments can also be largely wasteful or even detrimental for society when the competition is exacerbated and no new wealth is created. Hence, understanding what factors determine the total investment by contestants is of much interest.
Three studies examined behavior in costly competitions using an experimental game paradigm, "Invest Game", involving repeated investment decisions. I varied the competitive setting, in order to explore whether –and how– various economic and psychological aspects affect investment behavior. I examined several aspects of investment behavior: Overall investments in the different competition settings; the corresponding earnings from the competition; earnings were compared between the different competitions, and compared to the initial resources; the dynamics of investment over time, which could show escalation or moderation of the competition; and round-to-round changes in investment, in regard to the outcome (win or loss) in the previous round.  Paper   -top-
2. M.A. (2010). Steal the Show: Payoff Effect on Accuracy of Behavior-Prediction in Real High-Stake Dilemmas. Advisor: Gary Bornstein
Our study explores the ability to predict players' behavior in a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) type of game. We use "Split or Steal" video clips – a televised game show depicting a (very) high stake version of PD-esque game. Based on relevant psychological and economic literature, our main hypothesis is that motivated observers will predict the players' decisions more accurately than non-motivated observers. In order to examine the effect of incentives on prediction accuracy, we vary the reward for correct predictions; we conjecture that the bigger the reward, the more accurate the prediction. In addition, we explore correlations between the observers' accuracy and the players' decisions. We hypothesize that observers will more readily believe the players and consider them cooperators than assume that they will defect.  Paper   -top-